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EDITORIAL

WE cannot detach ourselves from the ordeal through which the British people is passing, nor pretend that we are not preoccupied with that. Comment on the course of the war, however, even in so far as it falls within our province, is at present impracticable in view of the rapid and incalculable torrent of events. It becomes more difficult than ever to attend to anything beyond the immediate tasks to which our duty to the nation impels us. Yet we believe that the readers of THEOLOGY, various as are the tasks in which they are engaged, have this in common—that they know themselves to be committed to the conflict on the spiritual as well as on the material plane. We are united in praying for insight into the true dimensions of God's visitation. Nor do we mean, more than is necessary, to relax our concern with the whole range of the Church's mission to the world.

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It seems a far cry from the latest war news in the daily Press to "A Table of Kindred and Affinity" which is printed at the end of the Book of Common Prayer, and which used to provide a curious diversion for the youthful mind during sermon-time at Mattins. It would not have occurred to us to return to a consideration of it at this moment, were it not that a Commission appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to consider the subject has recently published its Report.[1] If it had not been our editorial duty to read this publication, it is improbable that we should have done so; but, having done so, we can warmly recommend it to our readers.

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Commissions, appointed by authority in the Church of England, tend to produce reports that are either unanimous,

[1] *Kindred and Affinity as Impediments to Marriage* (S.P.C.K., 2s. 6d.).

dull and indefinite, or discordant, perplexing and therefore inconclusive. We gather that the Report of a recent Commission on the subject of Spiritualism displayed the latter characteristics to so marked a degree that it was deemed inadvisable even to publish it. The Commission on " Kindred and Affinity " has succeeded in avoiding both the Scylla and the Charybdis of official Anglican Reports. Its Report is unanimous, thorough and definite. It deserves to be studied not only because of the convincing way in which it has dealt with a complicated subject which not long ago aroused the most acrimonious prejudices, but also because it has worked out a methodology which will serve as a valuable model for the investigation of other problems. We have suffered too much in the past from the irreconcilable feuds of those who wish to rewrite theology in the light of " science "—vaguely, if not vainly, so-called—and those who want to shelter theology from the legitimate findings of the particular sciences. This Commission has recognized that particular sciences—in this case, biology, anthropology, and historical criticism—yield definite, if provisional, results which must be welcomed for their own sake, and which rightly contribute to the modification of ecclesiastical tradition. The Commission was fully entitled to request that greater attention should be paid to its method of studying the subject than to its " Recommendations " (p. 91); it is a method that, we hope, will be used in the study of other matrimonial problems.

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We hope too, that there will be no unnecessary delay in carrying out the recommendations of the Commission both in England and in the Anglican Churches abroad. It is pointed out that during the last eighty years revision of the traditional rules in regard to kindred and affinity as impediments to marriage has been going on in other Churches, including the Church of Rome and the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Anglican communion also needs to take action, both on account of the divergences between Archbishop Parker's Table and the existing laws of England and on account of the variety of social conditions with which the Churches abroad have to reckon. Briefly, the Commission recommends that " any revision of Parker's Table should proceed on the basis that some of its prohibitions are of universal and permanent obligation, and

others are prohibitions proper to differing social organizations" (p. 86). So far as we can judge, this distinction is valid, and the exact suggestions made by the Commission for a revised table of prohibited degrees for the Church of England in England are well-grounded.

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Not the least interesting part of the Report is the Commission's estimate of the advantages and disadvantages of a system of dispensations. The choice is between elaborate and numerous laws with dispensations to meet hard cases and simple and clear laws to which no exceptions are allowed. Since the Reformation the Church of England has followed the latter course. The advantages of both are more nicely balanced than appears at first sight. But it is necessary to choose between them, and the Commission is consistent in recommending that Archbishop Parker's Table of Prohibited Degrees should be reduced and that in England there shall be no provision for dispensations, although "it is not disposed to exclude the possibility of dispensation in the missionary Churches working amongst non-Christian people" (p. 76).

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Another Report, which we can warmly recommend, has recently been published, entitled *The Church in Country Parishes* (S.P.C.K., 2s.). This is the work of a Committee which was appointed by the Bishop of Winchester in June, 1939, and it is to be congratulated on having carried out its task in spite of the war. The Report, which is written in an engaging style, is alive to the forces of sociological change, and succeeds in showing what is happening in the country even if it fails a general scheme of reconstruction. In a changing situation only provisional suggestions can be made, and those made here are all to the good so far as they go. Most aspects of village life are discussed, but we miss any mention of the public-house. It would have been a good plan if an innkeeper had been appointed to serve on the committee. We get the impression that the committee held its meetings in country rectories, and that the report was entirely written in the parson's study.

Propaganda Fide

THE Christian, with the "idea of a Christian society" in the back of his mind, will not find work in an English newspaper office entirely satisfying. If he were at all a zealous Christian he might find it intolerable. He wishes to re-establish in society the values of his faith. The press is a great potential weapon, and a Christian might at first think himself lucky that he should be given some part in wielding it. But he finds that the press is a mirror, and also the servant, of society as it exists at present, and this is enough to overthrow all the Christian's hopes.

Let us understand the press, which is terrifyingly fair. It is made up nowadays of a few newspapers, generally with large circulations. Because it is the mirror of society it reflects all the fatal divisions in its beliefs, and because it is the servant of society it actively helps to perpetuate them. If men become Christians again and the agnostic a rarity, nowhere would Christian sentiments be more eloquently expounded than in the leader columns of the English newspapers. What the newspapers will not do is to advocate a Christian society when the bulk of their readers are agnostics and when the Christians themselves are so bitterly divided that one of an editor's main concerns is to prevent them from flying at each other's throat in his correspondence columns. The larger a paper's circulation the greater is its servitude to the divisions and prejudices, both secular and religious, of its readers. It means only that there are more of them to avoid provoking. It will give a little space to the Anglicans, Romans and Non-conformists, as well as to the Jews and ubiquitous infidels. If one were over favoured, the rest would cry out; if the newspaper sought to outline its own idea of a Christian society, it is certain that all would be violently outraged.

The bondage of the press is as astonishing as its power. The power exists; there is no denying it. You have only to go into a Ministry in Whitehall to find that newspapers, if they are often detested and despised, are also both feared and flattered. The new pill that is not advertised gets nowhere; so also the new politician. Reiteration is half the propagandist battle, and the newspapers can do this hypnotic work better than any other means. But the

press's power depends upon its bondage; it is important for all social reformers to understand this. The press, as mirror and servant of society, leaves its editors the most limited of monarchs. Few outside the offices realise the amount of pressure imposed on an editor by his readers. There is, indeed, a constant and indefinable communion between them. Both editor and readers move and think in the tradition which the paper has adopted, and that tradition must not be violated. Just as in polite society the man who is regarded as too " advanced " in his views is often shunned, so an editor must never be too far ahead of his readers. It may be true that some editors lead opinion, but in their turn they are led by what they have helped to make.

The editor depends on his readers' goodwill for his circulation and on his circulation for his advertisements, without which his paper would not appear at all. The necessity of advertisements is generally accepted as the greatest limitation on the freedom of the daily press. Advertisers are men of wealth who would view any radical changes in society, and in the system which maintains their privileged economic position, with great alarm. Advertisers are fairly close in sympathy, and if they saw any serious threat to the established inequalities of society from any one newspaper, they could, by united action, withdraw their custom and ruin it. This is not supposition. It was suggested by a question in Parliament that a concerted attack of this kind was made by the advertisers on a northern evening newspaper because of its strong anti-Munich policy in 1938.

The distributors of newspapers have also the arbitrary power of refusing to send those they dislike round the country. It is not necessary to sympathize with the opinions of the *Daily Worker* to admit that their propagation is severely hindered through its ostracism by the advertising and distributive interests. They disapprove of Communism because it would change society to their disadvantage. But their effective weapon could be used against any other newspaper that sought to change society in any other way. (This is a consideration for when peace comes. Clearly no newspaper can now argue for immediate social changes other than those ordered by a Government on which we depend for a victory which will leave our future in our own hands.)

In view of all these servitudes to which the press is sub-

jected it is not surprising that many ardent Christians, particularly those who believe that their religion orders them to change an evil society, have sighed after a newspaper of their own. A national newspaper is a vast mould of public opinion. All revolutionary parties of modern times, from Communists to Nazis and Fascists, have been awake to this and have used the press. Christians who feel that they have as much right, and rather more need, to be revolutionary than their secular rivals also dream of a newspaper which shall be as much a *Kampfblatt* as the *Völkischer Beobachter*. Of course, though their usefulness is great in another kind of way, the dream is not at all satisfied by news-letters, weeklies or quarterlies. They play their part in influencing opinion, but not as a newspaper which appears fresh every day on the bookstalls.

As it happens, Christians in this country were a long time ago challenged by the experiment made in another part of the Anglo-Saxon world by the Christian Scientists. One morning this letter was suddenly delivered to the Christian Science Board of Trustees in Boston, Mass.:

August 8, 1908.

Beloved Students,

It is my request that you start a daily newspaper and call it the *Christian Science Monitor*. Let there be no delay. The cause demands that it be issued now.

You may consult with the Board of Directors. I have notified them of my intentions.

Lovingly yours,
Mary B. G. Eddy.

Christian Scientists were on the whole even then a wealthy run of people, and the dollars came in soon enough to let the *Christian Science Monitor* have its first printing for November 25. Mrs Eddy did her best for the paper, which could not have had a prosperous beginning, by putting in print her desire that Christian Scientists should subscribe to it. "Every wish of Mrs Eddy," remarks one of her biographers of this, "was, and is, a command to loyal Christian Scientists." But for all the commanding the *Monitor* has only made a profit for two or three of the years since it was founded and has had to be subsidized out of the profits of the widely read religious literature coming from the same publishing house.

Commercial failure is not the point. Before the *Monitor*

appeared it was given an advance notice in another of Mrs Eddy's journals, the *Sentinel*:

> It will be the mission of the *Monitor* to publish the real news of the world in a clean, wholesome manner, devoid of the sensational methods employed by so many newspapers. There will be no exploitation or illustration of vice or crime, but the aim of the editors will be to issue a paper which will be welcomed in every house where purity and refinement are cherished ideals.

The emphasis on "purity and refinement" might have suggested that here was another pious and emasculated magazine for the home circle; instead it heralded one of the best newspapers in the world. All journalists respect the admirable dispatches sent home by the *Monitor's* foreign correspondents, and the lively sobriety of its home pages makes it the model of a sensible newspaper. Though it finds it hard to pay its way, even with its circulation of 160,000 to 170,000, it can hold its own in merit in company with papers like the *Manchester Guardian*. Part of its financial difficulties are owing to its severe censorship of advertisements, like those for drink or tobacco—a practice which, though gloomy enough in these instances, is worthy of praise in principle. Far from perfect, it is yet easily the best paper in the control of one kind of Christians, and it is worth remembering that just before it came out Mrs Eddy's business advisers begged her to leave *Christian Science* out of its title, calling it merely the *Monitor*. But she persisted in nailing the religious flag to the mast, rightly condemning the suggestion that she should hide the trade-mark of the wares she was trying to sell.

Do members of the long-established Church of England see any challenge to themselves in that achievement of a mere bantling sect, the *Christian Science Monitor*? Some, probably most, will go on thinking that our present national newspapers, apart from their human lapses, are everything that a true Christian society needs. Others, probably few, will believe that our newspapers do no more than give society a secular reflection of its secular self, and, as for working towards a gradual, pacific Christian revolution, have too much concern for their circulations to think of it. What is this second class of Anglican to do? He should have no doubt at all of the cultural influence of the daily press, and he knows that its present cultural influence is not a Christian one. If he is in the least combative, he

will wish to use the weapon of the press for the cause he believes in. He will wish to have a Christian newspaper (written by men of his faith—that is as near as we can get, and it will fall short) on the bookstalls and on the breakfast tables. Not a propaganda leaflet (like the *Daily Worker*, which has not the money to be more) but a newspaper. The distinction is important. Opinion is a luxury, but news is essential. Any paper that expects to be read daily by the average man must have all the news, political, foreign, commercial, sporting and dramatic. He may read a daily paper of opinion, but, if he does, he will in this country certainly insist on a daily paper of news as well. Thus he will still be open to the secular influences of either the popular or the serious press, and he will also have to be willing to spend more on journals than most people seem to be. So the hopeful Christian is thrown back on the full-size daily. It will have to have everything: correspondents in the Balkans, tipsters at Newmarket (if gambling is allowed), a woman's page, puzzle corner and all the other fairly innocent devices for tempting modern men and women to spend twopence or a penny a day. It will need to pay the heavy rates demanded by the news agencies, and all this money will be going out unbalanced by any coming in until that distant day when the slow-moving advertisers think the new paper merits their experimental custom. It is said that it took quite £2,000,000 to put the *Daily Herald* on its feet, and, even in peace-time circumstances, it would almost certainly take more to set another newspaper of the same character on its feet now.

Facts must be looked in the face. It is most improbable that the few Christians in this country who feel the need of their own daily newspaper will be able to find £2,000,000. What then must they do? They must choose an existing paper, one that they think least far away from the ideal, and give it their support. If they could make a large body of solidly loyal subscribers they would not find the editor ignoring them. Mr Middleton Murry makes this suggestion:

> Chosen journals must be supported by voluntary groups composed of people who understand the nature of capitalist society and its crushing effect on freedom of expression, and who therefore comprehend the necessity of paying a relatively high, non-competitive price for a journal, if it is to be able to exist independently of advertisements. In other words, they have to understand—implicitly or explicitly—that the condition of a

positive freedom of the Press is that the journal they support should not be a capitalist commodity at all. (*The Defence of Democracy* [1939], p. 293.)

Even this has its difficulties. The aim is to possess a paper with all the news and the usual features and which can exist without advertisements. Of course, there is no reason, in our present tolerant society, for a newspaper that comes under Christian control to lose all the advertisers. But this might happen if the journal took a consistently hostile stand against the present order of society, and its position without advertisers ought to be considered. (It may be said in passing that journals which take consistently hostile stands against what the world thinks good enough are also in danger of losing all their readers.)

Let us take an example. Suppose there exists a paper of standing published at 2d. a copy, with a circulation of about 60,000. If it were to lose its advertisements it would need an annual subsidy of about £150,000. If the subsidy were to be found from its readers it would bring the daily cost of the paper to 4d. But it is an established fact that every increase in the price of a newspaper brings down its circulation. For instance, at the beginning of the last war *The Times* had a circulation of about 300,000 at 1d. When the price was forced up by the rising cost of newsprint it was found that every increase of ½d. meant a loss of roughly 30,000 in circulation. Thus as the circulation of our supposed newspaper would probably fall below 60,000 directly its price rose to 4d., the Christians who wished to keep it going would soon find themselves having to pay several more pence a day.

This calculation is enough to show that the immediate prospects are not greatly promising. Yet the main obstacle to setting up or fostering a Christian daily in this country is that the bulk of Christians are by no means convinced that they need one. It is entirely true to say that most Christians are not aware that the present order is fundamentally un-Christian. Many still think a system which sets a hideous division between rich and poor is in some way divinely ordained. They are not shaken to their roots by knowing that eight million of our people exist on diets insufficient to maintain health merely because their wages are too low to do better. There is no freedom, of which we talk so much, when millions are in the chains of poverty; there is no democracy where the houses the poor live in,

the food they eat, the education they are given join to make one enormous economic obstacle to mental and physical equality with the few more fortunately placed. First make your Christian conscious of social injustice, then, perhaps, he will find the money for a daily to combat it. At present any journalist who knows his public is fairly sure that it would be hard to find 200,000 people dissatisfied enough with the pleasing enticements of the worldly press to pay more for a paper staffed by Christian men and specifically directed to Christian readers.

If there were 200,000 Christians who believed it their duty to purge society of injustice as far as it was in their power, then a newspaper would become possible because it would be needed and because the price would be paid. But how unpopular these men and their paper ought to be! We should be envious of the unpopularity earned by the Communists with their *Daily Worker*. According to their lights they are trying to change the world, which was once recognized as a Christian duty. What sacrifices they are willing to make to keep their poor news-sheet going! It is helped, like the Early Church, by the contributions of the poor. Yet because they are trying to alter the world they are hated. We should know: " If ye were of the world, the world would love its own: but because ye are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you." Not all who are hated are on the right track, but those on the right track will certainly be hated. A Christian newspaper with a true claim to its name would find enormous difficulties before it in England, but Christians are not the only people about today who believe they " have a world to win." That makes it important for them to arm themselves with every legitimate weapon used by their enemies. By ignoring the daily press they put their great cause in peril.

VIATOR.

Memories of Modernists and Others

II.—FAWKES AS PREACHER AND CRITIC

THE lack of an adequate pulpit (to which reference was made in the previous article on Alfred Fawkes) was a disappointment to Fawkes himself and to his friends. But to have satisfied the need would have required a fortunate

and almost fortuitous combination of conditions—a church not so large as to cause him to be inaudible except at close quarters, and a congregation of persons who would have appreciated the qualities and endorsed, or at least assimilated, the ideas of their preacher. A rationalism of eighteenth-century flavour, a style at once elusive and incisive, an application so modern as to look into the future, and a conviction unreservedly Christian—it might be said that a congregation which would benefit by such pulpiteering would require to be carefully chosen, unless or until the preacher drew his own eclectic company around him.

Perhaps Fawkes's most hopeful prospect lay once in the endeavour of an eminent friend to put his claims to the Crown when the Mastership of the Temple fell vacant. His style would probably have commended itself to that congregation of learned lawyers. And one advantage of such a pulpit would have been that, while it would have spurred him to rise to his best, it would not have taxed him to the extent of more than one sermon a Sunday, and that only during the Law Terms. He would have had adequate leisure for his reading, writing and reflection, which he regarded as indispensable to serious and constructive preaching. He had a story of a wise old Roman who was asked how often a man ought to preach, and delighted to quote the reply:

> " If he is an able man, once in two or three weeks; if he is an ordinary fellow, once a week; if he is a fool, every day !"

After many years of London, Brighton and the Continent, Fawkes would hardly have found his little country parish congenial were it not for his diligent habits of reading and writing. In Bacon's terms he was certainly a full man, and in many ways an exact man; but although he had sometimes a very persuasive tongue, his readiness was less pronounced than his fullness and his exactitude. Perhaps he suffered from too little preaching in great churches.

But Fawkes had a friend among the Divinity Professors at Cambridge, and occasionally figured as Select Preacher of the University Sermon. On those occasions he delighted in his own disquisitions, and yet referred to them with notable modesty. If they were modernist, it was rather in the sense of being modern; and modern in that of feeling after a future illumination which he sought to visualize.

They were plainly liberal; but the Protestant, the Erastian, and the Rationalist were the aspects of him through which for the most part he would proclaim in his incisive way the Christianity which he identified with the Founder. It was in one of these University Sermons that he likened the world to a great sea, as in the 104th Psalm: " Wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts. There go the ships—not that of Peter only—and there is that Leviathan—the Commonwealth, or State, of the philosopher —whom thou hast made to take his pastime therein." If Fawkes ever gave the impression of being a " Hobbesist," he never really had, as we shall note, sufficient trust in institutions to deceive him into any worship of the State; and if he were with us to-day he would assuredly be in revolt against the totalitarianism of recent growth. More than ten years ago he wrote his view in *The Morning Post* that Russia had put itself outside the pale of civilization; and there can be no doubt that to-day Fawkes's Christian philosophy would regard Nazi Germany with repugnance.

At his last appearance in the University pulpit on November 10, 1929, his sermon bore the title *The Church: a Necessary Evil*, and recalled a previous saying of his that " evil, while it remains evil, is necessary evil." He held that institutions, which of course include churches, are necessary evils, " because they can only to a certain extent be based upon and informed by religious principle." And he proceeded:

> " The religions of authority are fragments of an earlier age surviving in a later world. This is their refutation: for life is a stream; and in religion, as elsewhere, a return to the past is a contradiction in terms; the past is a stage in a process which has been left behind. The ' other disciple ' has outrun Peter."[1]

Fawkes's Erastianism would hold ecclesiastical authority in restraint; and his Rationalism would allow the free play of the intellect:

> " The unchecked predominance of the religious element in life, or of the Church in society, would be a disaster to mankind. It would mean intellectual and moral mediocrity, an essentially un-Christlike temper, and a narrow outlook—blindness to the totality of things."[2]

Perhaps this attitude was the inevitable reaction from the conditions which he had known as a Roman; for he quoted

[1] *The Church a Necessary Evil*, p. 21. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

the " saying of a wise man—a Roman Catholic priest of unquestioned orthodoxy—that the longer he lived the more impossible he found it to respect ecclesiastical authority." Fawkes, happier in the Church of England than he could have been in any other ecclesiastical institution, carried with him a suspicion and distrust of all institutions, and seemed to see the best hope in using one to check another. One sometimes wondered if in Fawkes's mind the two institutional evils, Church and State, were transmuted by his Erastianism into one good. But while the title and contents of Fawkes's swan song in the University pulpit might be startling to those who encountered them as their first introduction to his style and approach, they were familiar to his friends; and even his repetitions were sometimes in a setting which gave them freshness.[1]

It was noted by Fawkes's friends that he never spoke with bitterness or recrimination of the Roman Church, but only in a manner which was rationally critical. There is here an illustration of the effectiveness of one of his repeated quotations; for his criticism of Church authority, which had its apotheosis in the Roman system, found its familiar conclusion in the isolated fragment: " Whereas thou hatest to be reformed."

The career of Cardinal Newman provided him with a never-failing illustration. Familiar on his lips, it is to be found in print in his essay " The Development of Christian Institutions and Beliefs."[2] Newman's statement in his essay " Development," " Here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often," invited his condemnation; for, said Fawkes, " this, though he was not a Modernist, made him the father of Modernism." But Fawkes proceeded:

" . . . the Papacy represents, amongst other things, that fixed determination not to think, which is characteristic of the intellectually unregenerate in—and outside—all the Churches, and which cuts them off so effectually from the things of the mind and the movement of spirit. It is not that they do not know,

[1] On the occasion of the " Necessary Evil " the Bishop of Durham, happening to be in Cambridge, repaired to Great St Mary's to sit under his distinguished chaplain. He afterwards wrote to me: " Fawkes has always interested me very much. I heard his University Sermon, and listened with a melancholy wonder while I mentally compared his utterances with the Ordinal."

[2] *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1917, p. 112.

or even that they do not want to know. Either might be pardoned. But they go further; they want, and are resolved, not to know."

From this "invincible ignorance" followed, in Fawkes's belief, the attitude commonly encountered by the Liberal Churchman, of which in the same essay he said:

"The Liberal Churchman is made at times to feel himself 'an alien unto his mother's children'; 'fat bulls of Bashan close him in on every side.' He belongs, he is told, to 'the Sterile Party'; he is 'a literary clergyman, with an interest in theology'—surely this is better than being an illiterate clergyman, with no interest in theology? He is 'not constructive'—people who do not know what construction is are always insisting on this; or 'what he says is true, but he is not in a position to say it'; he is 'out of place among the clergy or in the Church.' What a conception of religion such a view implies! One has heard of the French *catholiques athées*. Religion, says Crabbe, 'often fears her friends.'"[1]

Fawkes, having returned from the Church of Rome, and being in more immediate contact with a cultured few. took some time to realize the extent of the blight of Protestant literalism upon the Church of England, even among numbers of those who called themselves Anglican Catholics,

As a liberal, Fawkes would accept the conclusions of critical scientific investigation; but I should not have thought of him as being undogmatic when dogma was not at enmity with reason. But he was primarily a philosopher, rather than primarily a theological critic. Still less, as I realized, was he at all versed in law, in spite of his law-abiding churchmanship. He knew that there was in Statute Law (*i.e.*, before the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937) an obligation upon the incumbent of a parish to celebrate, if requested, the marriage of a successful petitioner for divorce, being a parishioner; and when he heard of cases of repudiation of the statute, and refusal to comply with its provision, on the part of any of the clergy, his sense of propriety and duty suffered a shock. But this was an easy point, of which anybody with a little study and thought could gain a grasp; and beyond it he seemed to find himself at sea. When I began to write a book on Marriage Law Reform, which I had the hardihood to claim to be an original contribution to the subject, I had to confess to some dis-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

appointment with his opinions. First, he commended a book on marriage as containing all the law that was needed; and I found that it was not a law book at all and misquoted statutes and much else. Secondly, he said that he wished that the subject of marriage and divorce could be discussed without reference to the Bible and the Church, but only as a matter of expediency. It seemed to me that he would exclude precedent. To exclude the Church in history would exclude Canon Law; and since there is a large heritage of Canon Law in the matrimonial statutes, Fawkes's own wish could be gained only by a root-and-branch policy which would be contrary to his own principles. For he held that change, which is necessary to life, could rightly be effected only by development from existing institutions. But he seemed not to contemplate law reform and the work of jurists in this light; and perhaps there were some things which were not dreamed of in Fawkes's philosophy.

Again, it was certainly true, as Dr Major said of him, that biblical criticism, especially in the region of the Old Testament, was not his *forte*. He knew what it was about, but he had himself no critical apparatus; and it was not his *métier* to review the work of specialists in that gallery. Yet he knew a good deal about Christian theological development; and observed of Dr Raven's book on *Apollinarianism* that it was an excellent specimen of pure theology which was rare in England. Upon the Church and ecclesiastical politics he could always write with insight, and illuminate the subject. The things that he knew he knew well; and controversialists in philosophy and religion found in Fawkes a learned, sharp and formidable mind. While he understood the Church with its roots in the past, he conceived of it as capable of evolution and adaptability to change; and his criticisms of ecclesiastical authority were due to its being, as he held, static and stupid. Thus he wrote of his friend Loisy:

> " His work is primarily a contribution to the philosophy of religion. But it is his criticism rather than his philosophy which has brought him into conflict with ecclesiastical authority. The latter it does not understand; of the former it sees only the negative side, being too unintelligent either to recognize that this is a prelude to construction, or to appreciate the necessity of the construction to which it leads."[1]

[1] *Studies in Modernism*, p. 64.

While, as he implies in another place, the Liberal Protestant allowed sentiment to colour the conclusions of academic thought, and the Catholic Modernist was more objective and actual, yet he could write of Harnack and Loisy that:

"They are workers in a common field and towards a common purpose: to many it will seem that the points on which they differ are fewer and less vital than those on which they are agreed."[1]

Such a view was typical of Fawkes, who refused to be pinned finally to any microscopic points of controversial criticism, but preferred to regard the controversies as transitory and the work of the controversialists as moving on different lines to a new enlightenment. It may be recalled that some of Fawkes's critics inclined to regard him as negative and as unduly disposed to proclaim what he did not believe rather than what he did. If that were to any extent true, it was only a "prelude to construction," for there certainly was a side of him which could be called prophetic. He insisted that the value of devotion to the past is strictly limited, for it is found to sterilize the aims and aspirations of man for the future: "it blocks the gates of the morning, and checks the horses of the sun." Of the famous Girton Conference of Modern Churchmen in 1921 one of his criticisms was brief. He said that in his judgment it only went to show that there had been an ante-Nicene age. But Fawkes's part behind the scenes of that episode, his correspondence and his comments, may perhaps occupy another paper.

J. F. W. Boden-Worsley.

(*To be concluded.*)

The Church—A Key to the Conflict in Anglican Theology

There are already some "older" theologians who, by recognizing the gulf between "older" and "younger" theologians, have begun to bridge it. The Archbishop of York, and those who have followed his lead, have already done much to prevent the gulf from becoming an impassable chasm between the generations. The inevitable result of this is that constructive discussion has taken the place of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

arid misunderstanding, and the difference of age has begun to fall into its proper place of secondary importance.

But there still appears to be a doubt in the minds of some " older " theologians as to whether a real conflict with their younger brethren exists. In part, I suspect, this is due to a psychological necessity of their theological position. It is of the essence of their theology that it is up to date. Therefore they have an inherent difficulty in accepting the fact that there is a serious rift between themselves and a " newer " and " younger " school of theologians.

Some others, who recognize the existence of the rift, dismiss it as being merely a rift between themselves and a narrow group of " extreme Catholics," and imagine that the great majority of younger theologians are following contentedly in the wake of their elders. Actually this is almost the reverse of the truth. Far from the protest against the theology of the recent past being confined to a group of " extreme Catholics," it is not confined to the Anglican Church. Indeed, it is at its most acute in some of the Free Churches. It is to be found amongst the thinking younger clergy of all denominations, it is to be found amongst the better students in practically all theological colleges.

The attitude of the majority of thinking younger men is that most older theologians are not merely incapable of understanding their problems, but also fundamentally wrong in their whole approach to theology. Needless to say, such a bitter division is not without its emotional accompaniment. There is scarcely a subject, theological, sociological or international, upon which the typical older theologian can speak without jarring the nerves of his younger counterpart in every second sentence. Lack of understanding between the generations is no new thing; what is peculiar to our situation is that even at its most intense the rift is rarely personal. On the contrary, many of the younger men have a real affection for their elders, combined with a great respect for their scholarship and gratitude for what they have learnt from them. The conflict is on the theological plane, and it runs so deep that the majority of the younger men feel that it is entirely futile to attempt to bridge the gulf. The reason why the subject has sprung into prominence in the pages of THEOLOGY during the past few months is because some of the younger " Catholics " cannot accept that majority opinion. One of the chief functions of the Episcopate is the custody of the Faith.

Therefore young " Catholic " theologians who feel a gulf between themselves, on the one hand, and the bishops and the older theologians who influence them on the other, must of necessity attempt to bridge the gulf. They cannot, like their " non-Catholic " brethren, " wait till the old men die." Furthermore, however intense the theological disagreement, there remains for the " Catholic " the solid knowledge that his bishop is his father-in-God, and however truculent he may be, and however schoolmasterish the bishop may be, that underlying fact, given in the nature of the Church, makes the bridging of the gulf both necessary and possible.

If, however, the discussion is not to degenerate we must get beneath the distinction into " older " and " younger " and face much more clearly the points of theological dispute. It is true that the vast majority of the older theologians are in one camp, and the vast majority of the younger are in the other; but the discovery of a difference of age between the disputants does not help to clarify the nature of a theological dispute.

The difficulty in this task of clarification is that the divergence is so deep that it appears whatever is being discussed. It would be possible to start the discussion on the basis of almost any pronouncement of almost any " older theologian " on almost any subject. The divergence is clearly seen in our attitude to the war, to Church finance, to politics, to Federal Union, to the Church overseas and so forth. But if the discussion is started on these kinds of subjects, the fundamental difference is probably lost in a mass of secondary detail; understanding is not reached, and the rift is rather widened than otherwise.

There are, I believe, however, three main ways in which we can approach the subject: first, by discussing the relation of reason and revelation; secondly, by discussing the relation of nature and grace; and thirdly, by discussing the nature of the Church. The discussion of any of these three inevitably involves the discussion of the others, but of the three I am inclined to think that the discussion of the nature of the Church is the most profitable point of entry, because the trail is less obscured by interesting " red herrings " than is the case with the other two. It must, however, be admitted that not all the younger theologians recognize the point with which I deal in the remainder of this article as pivotal in the sense I believe it to be.

The Church

Does the Church exist to perform a function in the world, or is it, on the contrary, the world which exists to serve the Church? The answer given to that question divides theologians into the two camps more sharply than any other of which I know.

I believe that it is the destiny of mankind to become the Church and that to think of the Church as existing to subserve any purpose, however high and noble, is a serious error. It is, in effect, the same error as that of capitalism, communism and fascism in relation to man. They fail to regard man as an end in himself, and regard him as a function of society—a factory hand, or a unit of the state. That is to say, they treat man as of importance solely in regard to what he does and not in regard to what he is. To each man they assign a function and regard him as of value simply as the agent by which that function is performed. Similarly, many regard the Church as an organization for doing something rather than an organism which exists in its own right.

It is obvious that many of the answers given to the question "What is the task of the Church?" are inadequate; it is not so obvious that the question itself is both blasphemous and absurd.

It would be hard to find a term which would cover all the various activities which are proper to the Church's life, for they are as wide as life; but even if such a term could be found it would not describe the Church's function, for it has none. Its *raison d'être* is not what it does, but what it is. The contrast between this position and that in, for instance, Canon Barry's *Relevance of the Church* is enormous. To talk of the relevance of the Church is to talk back to front. It is not the Church which is relevant to society or the world, but the world and society which are relevant to the Church.

It is important to realize that the view which rejects this position springs from a perfectly valid protest against the insularity and self-centredness of the ecclesiastical machine. This self-centredness, it is said, is what results when the Church thinks of itself as existing for itself. What is not realized is that when the protest is thus negatively made it more surely cripples the universality of the Church than the disease it is trying to cure, for it makes the Church a

part of society, an organ of society existing to do something for society. A self-centred, ecclesiastical bureaucracy, damnable as it is, is not quite so hopeless as this utilitarian conception of the Church.

The true answer to ecclesiastical self-centredness is the proclamation of the truth that mankind only fulfils the purpose for which it was created in so far as it becomes the Church of God, the Body of Christ. Christ Himself came that He might serve. The Church, which is His Body, cannot do less. But no one, to the best of my knowledge, has ever been blasphemous enough to say that service is the reason for the existence of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. Christ (being God) is, by His own right, not because of any service He performs. But His nature being love, He serves. The Church (being His Body) exists in its own right; it does not exist to serve, yet none the less service is inseparable from its essence.

Instead of looking first at tasks to be performed, and only secondly at the Church as the agent for their performance, we should look first at the Church as a divine creation and judge all "tasks" by whether they are proper to its divine life.[1]

There is, of course, nothing at all original in this view. It is the traditional view of the Church, in the Bible, in the Fathers and in our Anglican liturgy (*e.g.*, Collects for Good Friday and the Prayer for the Church). Though it is not explicitly stated, and the issue does not appear to have been faced, it is certainly not denied in the Doctrine Report, but it is very frequently denied in practice.

It would be hard to find a Christian who would admit that he denied the sovereignty of God, still less one who would admit that he was a polytheist. Yet to many of the younger theologians it appears that a great many Christians are unconsciously guilty of both these things. This point is perhaps most clearly seen in the sphere of economics. It is commonly agreed that it is contrary to the will of God that people should be hungry and, at the same time, food should be destroyed; but it is suggested that economic factors make it impossible to remedy the situation, at least for the time being. This is to admit that there is an area

[1] What I have said in regard to the Church is sometimes applied to the Kingdom of God. That I feel to be a misunderstanding of the essential meaning of the βασιλεια, which I take to be primarily the rule of God, rather than the community over which He reigns.

of life in which God is not sovereign, that there is another god—inexorable economic law.

This kind of denial of the divine sovereignty grows logically out of the false conception of the Church as an organization with a function. For this conception inevitably regards the Church as a function of society or the State. Thus the Church comes to be considered as the lesser, and the State or the community as the greater entity which includes the lesser. Hence the divine rule which is the matter of the Church's message is treated as merely one element in the life of the community, and this makes room for the rule of other gods. This point is particularly clearly seen in relation to the Establishment. In its crudest form the Church is considered as a department of the Civil Service. More generally the Church is treated as " the religious side of the life of the State." Often it is subtler than this. Many of the sermons preached on the basis of the Archbishop's Recall to Religion were typical of the attitude, " The nation is going to the bad—come back to Church, and restore the national life." Hundreds of war-time sermons have been equally back to front. Thus the Establishment is increasingly thought of as a relationship in which the Church is established by the State, rather than as a relationship in which the State is blessed by the Church and acknowledges itself to be under the divine judgment which the Church proclaims. This perversion is, of course, made easier by the fact that the Church on earth consists of men who both individually and collectively are prone to sin. None the less, the whole conception of the relation of the State to the Church is thus inverted and corrupted, and the doctrine of the divine sovereignty effectively denied.

The relationship of revelation and reason is likewise corrupted by the false conception of the Church. Once the Church is considered as merely existing to perform a function in society, Revelation, the language of the Church, becomes secondary, and human " reason," the language of society, becomes dominant; and the former is tested by the latter rather than *vice versa*. It should, of course, be remembered that human " reason " is conditioned by the society in which it is current. What passed for reason in the Middle Ages would not invariably be considered reason to-day. Thus the eternal verities of the Christian Faith are made secondary to the partial insight of contemporary

thought. This is not, of course, in any way to deny the importance of reason. My point is merely to show how a perverted view of the Church inverts the relationships of reason and revelation.

The older theologians, in their attempt to state the Christian Faith in terms understood by their contemporaries, tended to be betrayed into stating the Christian Faith in terms of a non-Christian world view (*Weltanschauung*). What was not commonly realized was that a merely non-Christian world view is impossible—a world view must be Christian or anti-Christian. Thus " the scientific view of the world " which was thought to be not incompatible with the Christian Faith has given place to Nazism and Marxism. The " scientific view of the universe " was actually from the beginning a " will o' the wisp." It is not the business of natural science to have a world view. It is only concerned with a part of reality, and where it is claimed that this is not so the attitude has ceased to be scientific and become atheistic. " Naturalism " is a world view, which is anti-Christian. It is at best a bastard child of natural science.[1]

The attempt to inject Christianity into a non-Christian system of thought, or to defend the Christian Faith by restating it in terms of a non-Christian world view, similarly has its roots in the false conception of the Church. So long as the Church is not recognized as greater than the world, the attempt will be made to state her message in terms of what is believed to be the larger reality. It is only when it is seen that the significance of the world is derivative, that the world is important because it houses the Body of Christ, that men will realize that they must state their secular knowledge in terms of a Christian world view, and not *vice versa*, if they are to be true to the nature of reality.

The view of the Church expounded in this article is, of course, repugnant to the natural man; so are the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement and all the great verities of the Christian Faith. Were it not that it occurs in the Bible, and we are too desensitized by familiarity to be shocked by anything it says, we should most of us

[1] I do not mean to identify Christianity with any particular world view. But a world view may, I think, properly be termed Christian when its superstructure of human reason rests on the foundations of the revealed truths of the nature of God and His universe.

consider St Paul's reference to the corrupt Church in Corinth as the body of Christ to be sheer blasphemy. Knowing the Church as we do, the individual sinfulness of its members, the entanglement of its institutions with a corrupt society, the lack of vision of its official bodies, its dearth of spiritual leadership, how dare we say that the whole creation exists to house it?

The most obvious escape from the devastating nature of the truth is to say that the Church exists to build something else. Thus commonly people talk of the Church existing to build the Kingdom of God; but, as we have seen, the Kingdom implies the rule of God, rather than the community over which that rule is exercised. If kingdom is used in its primary modern sense (the community which receives the rule) and not its primary biblical sense (the rule itself), then the Church is the Kingdom of God. There is no other such community known to the New Testament writers.

The second line of escape is to accept what has been said as applicable to the "ideal" Church, but to mark this off quite clearly from the imperfect "empirical" Church which must not think too highly of itself and only exists to perform a function. There is a profound truth in this. Any body of sinful men is still far from perfection, and so long as we are imperfect we exist to become something other than we are, and therefore our existence is not yet an end in itself. But the only function which the "empirical" Church can be said to exist to perform is the function of becoming itself. Neglect of the doctrine of the Communion of Saints, combined with neglect of the "givenness" of the Church, has led people to forget that the corruption and inadequacy of the Church as we know it is as nothing compared to the divine life which dwells in her despite the sinfulness of her members. The Church on earth, in becoming herself, by virtue of divine grace, which is unmerited by her members either individually or corporately, fulfils the reason for her institution.

I have carefully avoided saying thus far in this article that the Church exists for the glory of God. For though that is, of course, true, yet when the question is asked,[1] "For what function does the Church exist?" and the answer

[1] This is the fallacy of many questions; *cf.* "When did you stop beating your wife?" (1. Did you beat your wife? 2. If so, when did you stop doing so?) "For what function does the Church exist?" (1. Does the Church exist to perform a function? 2. If so, what is that function?)

is given, " It exists to glorify God," the question itself being without meaning the answer becomes untrue.

The crudest form of this mistake is, of course, that in which the glorifying of God is reduced to worship, conceived of as merely the recitation of hymns and prayers and the performance of the cult. This view of the Church existing for the glory of God brings us right back to the notion that the Church is a small body within society whose function is to carry on the specifically religious part of the community's life. The Church is thus again thought of as the religious organ of the community, and, though it may be said to exist to glorify God, it is really being thought of as existing to do something for the community. But the mistake is not usually nearly so crude as that. The whole life of mankind is seen as only fulfilling its purpose within the Church, and the Church is seen as fulfilling its purpose only in the worship of God.

This is so very near the truth that we are usually prepared to let it pass without adding the necessary qualifications. God did not create man because He needed him but because of the overflowing perfection of love. There is no selfishness in the act of creation. The Church glorifies God, but mankind was not created, nor the Church instituted, *in order that* she might do so, for so to say is to attribute to the Godhead a motive unworthy of even our human conception of the perfection of love.

The Church glorifies God, but it would be truer to say that she exists because she glorifies God than to say she exists in order to glorify God.[1] We cannot say, first, she exists, secondly, she exists for the purpose of glorifying God. The glorifying of God is not the purpose of her existence, it is the nature of that existence. God alone is ultimate being. His name is " I am." In Him alone, being perfect in His being, there is no becoming; but the Church in her unity with her divine Lord fulfils her becoming, and in virtue of that unity, which is her essence, exists in her own right, being made one with Him who is. The Church on earth consists of imperfect men who are in process of becoming, but the Church herself, by the nature of her divine institution, already is.[2] We, her members, and indeed all mankind,

[1] This point is perhaps more familiarly stated in the form: The Church glorifies God by what she is rather than by what she does.
[2] Discussions I have had with several friends who have seen this article make it clear that this section requires fuller treatment than either my ability or the length of the article permits. The following

have but one function to perform—to become the Church of God: in that there is the fulfilment of all things. The task includes every proper activity of man from evangelism to art and politics.

This doctrine of the Church is the reverse of ecclesiastical quietism, with which it may easily be confused. What is urged here is not that the world has no relation to the Church but the opposite of that. The world existing solely to house the Church, every aspect of its life is relevant to the life of the Church. When the Church is thought of as relevant to the world (considered as the greater entity) the Church (the smaller entity) is inevitably limited in her relation to the world's life to certain spheres, and the secularization of large areas of life becomes inevitable. It is for this reason that the attempt to preach the relevance of the Church —the attempt to Christianize this or that part of the life of the community—is so futile. The whole process is back to front. The Church does not exist to serve the world. The world exists to house the Church; in her creation is fulfilled. *That* is the basis of our concern with art, politics, economics, education, agriculture and every other phase of human activity. Hence it is that the " younger theologians " not only reject the " business is business," " keep politics out of the pulpit " type of Christianity, but also reject (and with even more distaste) the attempts of their seniors to apply Christianity to social problems, politics and the like. Christianity is not a poultice to be applied to the world's ills. Christianity is the response we make to the love of God, our sovereign Lord, Creator and Judge, with the totality of our being. Hence it is as unmeaning to talk of applying Christianity to economics as it is to talk of applying it to our devotional life. Christianity is not a part of life which can be applied to other parts. God is sovereign over all, and we must respond to His love in every aspect of our life.

Is it too much to hope that those older theologians who have still not seen the danger to which the rift between the generations exposes the Anglican Church will attempt to

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may indicate the points of which such a development would have to take account:

1. Is the Church properly described a creature ?
2. The Greek doctrine of Theosis.
3. 2 Peter i, 4.

enter into questions such as that raised in this article in an idiom which their juniors can understand, and thus make available to them the benefit of that scholarship and experience which they alone can give? The Archbishop of York has already shown that the task is not impossible. He deserves the gratitude of all who think it important that the "younger" theologians should not feel isolated from their elders.

MICHAEL BRUCE.

Comprehensiveness or Fertility?

I DO not know who it was that first spoke of "the comprehensiveness of the Church of England," nor who it was that sought to improve upon the phrase by inserting the epithet "glorious." Whatever its origin, it has become a byword, quoted by some in tones of genuine admiration, by others in scorn and bitter sarcasm.

Whether this alleged comprehensiveness is a virtue or a vice depends upon the mode of its exercise. If it secures a freedom from excessive rigidity where rigidity is undesirable, it is a virtue deserving of admiration. If it ignores the truth that the Church has a gospel to proclaim which it cannot proclaim unless its members are in agreement about what that gospel is, it is a vice deserving of scorn and sarcasm. All would agree that the Church should be comprehensive in the right way and should not be comprehensive in the wrong way—that is, that it should have room for "all sorts and conditions of men," and give them all possible scope for the development of their varied spiritual gifts, but that in the attempt to be and do this it should not cease to be a body which is definitely one in faith and order. The difficulty is to discover how to combine these two aims.

I am not concerned in this paper with the question whether the Church of England is at present comprehensive after a virtuous or a vicious fashion. My purpose is to suggest that those who advocate a virtuous comprehensiveness will never achieve their object so long as they think in these terms, and that we should substitute another way of thinking about and stating the ideal which they have in mind. But a little further consideration of the present

state of affairs will help to make clear the importance of the matter, which concerns not the Church of England alone but the whole of Christendom.

Among those who are working for the unity of the Christian Church throughout the world it is a commonplace to say that unity is not uniformity, that our aim is a Church into which each of the existing separated churches will bring the treasures of its own peculiar tradition and contribute them to the richness of the common life. But if so, when we reflect that the range to be covered extends from Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism to the Society of Friends and the Independency of the South India United Church and of Dr Albert Peel's *Inevitable Congregationalism*,[1] the problem of discovering a virtuous comprehensiveness which shall be adequate to the task seems to require a faith which can not only move mountains but square circles. Meanwhile, the attempt of the Church of England to be comprehensive over a section of the whole range is under criticism from those who are outside at either end. On the one hand Orthodox, Roman Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists say that our latitude is so wide that we have no real unity and are a Church only in name; on the other hand Independents regard our insistence on the historic Creeds and Orders of Christendom as setting bounds which cramp the activity of the Holy Spirit and deny the freedom of God's grace.

While I was musing over this apparently insoluble problem, light broke upon it from an unexpected quarter. In order to make my meaning clear I must quote in full the passage through which the light came. It will be found in the last chapter of the late Lord Grey's book *The Charm of Birds*.

" Thus people of all creeds or no creed are drawn to the search for laws and guiding principles in Nature. They seek to find rest in theories of evolution, survival of the fittest, natural selection and so forth. In birds, for instance, it is very satisfactory to find and note some habit, or some protective colouring of plumage or eggs, that has been evolved and to which the survival and welfare of the species is due. Yet it seems to be beyond the utmost ingenuity of human intellect to stretch any of these natural laws or processes sufficiently to make them cover and account for all that we see. I have therefore taken refuge in the hypothesis that there is in nature some tendency or purpose ever at work

[1] London, The Independent Press, 1937.

for the sake of creating infinite variety. Much of this appeals to man in the form of what he calls beauty. In civilized man, at any rate from Homer onwards, the sense of natural beauty has been as innate as the moral sense of right and wrong. People will decide, each for himself, whether these senses are a particle of the Divine innate in mankind, or whether they are a blind outcome of man's experience, evolved by survival of the fittest. I will not digress further into this vast subject. Personally I find satisfaction in the comprehensive though vague conception that infinite variety is part of the purpose or plan in Nature; and that within this larger conception there are others, such as protective colouring, that do effective work but produce more limited results."

Two points are here to be noted in the belief to which Lord Grey was led as a result of a lifelong study of bird life. He had given up the attempt to discover utilitarian laws which should comprehend the variety of the phenomena which came under his observation, and had substituted belief in an æsthetic delight in variety on the part of Nature or God. But he did not deny the importance of the utilitarian laws as contributing towards the realization of the desired variety. There would be no varied beauty of bird life if birds ceased to exist or ceased to be birds, and so it is necessary that there shall be factors which induce to mating and provide protection. The important thing is that we should not try to coerce the variety within the utilitarian laws, but value the laws as subserving the variety.

Now let us suppose for the sake of argument that Lord Grey is right, and that the natural world reveals a Creator who rejoices in the beauty of infinite variety and has ordained "laws which never shall be broken" for the purpose of producing this variety and enabling it to exist without confusion. If we take this as a parable and apply it to the problem of Christian unity, what will be the result?

There must be, as we have seen, that unity in faith and order which will secure that the Church shall continue to exist, shall continue to be Christian, and shall be saved from chaos and confusion. But the purpose of this unity in faith will be that the Church, while continuing to exist and to be Christian, shall without chaos and confusion express itself in as rich and varied a profusion of types of Christian life and worship as is possible, because its life and worship are offered to the God who loves variety.

Now this is a complete reversal of what is suggested by the term "comprehensiveness." For comprehensiveness suggests that the invariable faith and order must somehow be stretched so as to include within them all the varied life and worship of the Church; the invariable element in the Church's constitution is to be the circumference bounding the scope of the Church's activities. But if we follow Lord Grey's parable, the faith and order which must be invariable will not be stretched round the circumference but concentrated at the centre, where their ambition will be to generate infinitely varied types of life and worship radiating to an infinity that knows no circumference, yet all genuinely and recognizably Christian and so neither chaotic nor confused.

If, therefore, we Anglicans are ever to glory in the variegated character of our communion, I suggest that the word we should use for it is not comprehensiveness but fertility. And I should hope that if we do so it will influence both our own thinking and that of others in a way which will itself be fertile for good. In the sphere of faith the attempt to be comprehensive leads to such a thinning out of the content of the Christian gospel that the Church is in danger of ceasing to stand for anything definite at all. In the sphere of order it produces a toleration of irregularities in the ministration of the sacraments and in discipline which is based on no intelligible principle and is so wide as to be almost indistinguishable from anarchy. And while we are thus in danger of losing our Christian character and cohesion we do not gain in attractiveness to others. To those who are reared in the traditions and cling to the ideals of Independency, we still appear to be seeking to confine within limits the freedom of the Spirit and to deny that "the Lord hath yet more light and truth to break forth from His Holy Word."

But if our watchword be fertility rooted in Christian faith and order, then we shall ourselves be freed from the temptation to weaken the roots, and our desire to keep them strong will have no terrors for those who care for the luxuriance of the Church's growth. Neither Dr Peel nor the members of the South India United Church would deny that the freedom for which they stand is *Christian* freedom, freedom to discover and express whatever ways of thought and life and worship are opened up to man by God through Christ. It is reasonable to hope that if they

were convinced that our care for definiteness of faith and regularity in order has as its one and only aim to ensure that these shall be genuine expressions of the Christian gospel united in the fellowship of the body of Christ, they would recognize the need of some agreed statement of what that faith is, and some accepted "joints" to supply that by which the whole body is fitly joined together and compacted.[1]

It is our Anglican belief that in a united Church for the whole of Christendom the historic Creeds and threefold order of the ministry will be found to provide the necessary statements of faith and "joints." I am not so foolish as to think that merely by saying "fertility" instead of "comprehensiveness" we shall win all Christians to acceptance of this belief. All I wish to suggest is that so long as we think in terms of comprehensiveness we conceal from ourselves and from others the true place and function of the necessary invariable elements of faith and order in the Christian Church, and that to think in terms of fertility will enable us to be definite in faith, coherent in order, and free in spirit.

LEONARD HODGSON.

Religious Statistics Concerning Recusants of the Stuart Period

THE number of Protestant Nonconformists and of Roman Catholic recusants who held their faith under penal laws and tests interested statesmen and bishops of the later half of the seventeenth century, and they interest historians to-day. The bishops then still hoped for an all-inclusive national Church, while many of the statesmen regarded Protestant Dissenters as potential revolutionaries and Roman Catholics as a "fifth column" who might aid a French invader. The strength of these religious bodies is significant not only for the history of toleration in England, but also for any commentary on English history between the Restoration of 1660 and the Revolution of 1688.

Mr Brian Magee in his book *The English Recusants*[2] has

[1] Eph. iv, 16. [2] *A Study of the Post-Reformation Catholic Survival and the Operations of the Recusancy Laws* (Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1938).

attempted an estimate of the numbers of English Roman Catholics, both avowed and secret, in the Stuart period. His conclusion that 50 per cent. of the population at the end of Queen Elizabeth's reign was Catholic and 25 per cent. (one-eighth avowed, one-eighth secretly) in 1688 will surprise most students, and, although he quotes numbers of contemporary statistics with an obvious intention of interpreting them fairly, his eagerness to establish his thesis betrays him time and again into statements or arguments which shake one's confidence in his judgment and thesis. These can be grouped in four classifications as—

(i) Conclusions unwarranted by his evidence.
(ii) Acceptance, as evidence of fact, of single opinions of doubtful value.
(iii) The use of doubtful figures and of arguments based on insufficient examination of figures.
(iv) Mistakes into which he has been led by accepting the statements of previous writers instead of examining the documents for himself.

When he reaches the period of the Civil War, Mr Magee on p. 121 twice quotes Lord Castlemaine (who wrote a generation after the war), first claiming that two-fifths of the Royalist officers killed in the Civil War were Catholics, and then estimating the Catholics as " not the hundredth part of the nation." The latter statement is dismissed as " sheer propaganda of a crude kind," which, says Mr Magee, " certainly does not inspire great confidence in any of Castlemaine's assertions." Yet Mr Magee repeatedly quotes the other assertion: on pp. 123 and 163 with the qualifications " are said to have been " and " according to Castlemaine "; while on pp. 197 and 206 the statement is given as proven fact without any qualification.

Similarly, Mr Magee quotes (pp. 163-4) a letter of December, 1642 (author unspecified), stating that " six or seven thousand known papists and recusants " were serving in Newcastle's army. In the next paragraph he quotes Fairfax's estimate of Newcastle's forces as 8,000, and continues: " If these figures are correct, three-quarters of this army was composed of Catholics." On p. 206 Mr Magee states without qualification " the northern army under the command of the Duke of Newcastle seems to have been almost entirely composed of Catholics." And this on the

evidence of a single letter written, not from the scene of action, but from Ipswich !

Mr Magee is at pains to multiply by more than three the numbers of known Catholic recusants to reach figures inclusive of Papists who went to church but not to communion, and those who conformed fully but were of Catholic sympathies. His evidence is far from satisfying. He produces figures for the dioceses of London and Ely (1603), for forty-three Lancashire parishes (1613), and for the parish of St Saviour's, Southwark (temp. James I), in which non-communicants outnumbered recusants. Mr Magee has no hesitation in claiming all these non-communicants as Catholics. Then, on the authority of Notestein he quotes (p. 114) " a certain Mr Brooks " who in 1621 in the House of Commons referred to Papists " who I protest I think are more easily discovered by their ill speaking of the King and Queen of Bohemia than by not receiving the communion." This Mr Magee follows (p. 115) with a " report," which he admits must be accepted with reserve, " that in 1622 the English Catholics actually sent financial aid to the Emperor, to the extent of no less a sum than £30,000." On the authority of these loose statements Mr Magee thinks fit to pronounce (p. 115): " We have thus evidence that the non-communicants were more numerous than the recusants, and that those whose Catholic sympathies were revealed by their support of the Emperor were again more numerous than the non-communicants." Without a careful examination of the returns made in 1603 from the other dioceses, Mr Magee has no right to say of England in general that we have evidence that the non-communicants were more numerous than the recusants. In 1603 the bishops obtained from their clergy a return parish by parish of communicants, non-communicants and recusants. Of these returns there is a summary among the Harleian MSS, omitting the non-communicants except for Ely and London, where the non-communicants very substantially outnumbered the recusants. Among the Lansdowne MSS Mr Magee found a partial return (1613) for Lancashire in which the non-communicants outnumbered the recusants by a small proportion. Mr Magee has apparently not consulted the return for Lincoln Diocese published in Canon Foster's *State of the Church* (Lincoln Record Society), in which the recusants far outnumbered the non-communicants. The Liber Cleri of 1603 for the whole diocese is preserved

in the Lincoln Diocesan Registry, and has been printed and carefully analysed in Canon Foster's book. The Liber Cleri gives these figures (Foster, p. 445):

Non-communicants.		*Recusants.*	
Men.	*Women.*	*Men.*	*Women.*
20	20	95	127

No non-communicants were returned for the archdeaconries of Lincoln, Stow, Huntingdon and Leicester, though, Canon Foster notes (p. lix), " presentments in the books of *detectiones* and *comperta* show that there were persons who did not communicate." Of the forty non-communicants given in the Liber Cleri, eleven lived in the archdeaconry of Bedford, where there were thirty-three recusants, and twenty-nine in the archdeaconry of Buckingham, where there were ninety recusants.

Nor are other figures Mr Magee quotes always reliable. Of the Harleian MS 280, whose summary he quotes, he observes (pp. 82-3) that there are " minor discrepancies " in the totals, and comments: " These discrepancies, however, are trivial; they may be due either to errors in transcribing details from the original document, or to errors in the episcopal summary, but they are, for our purposes, of no great consequence." Canon Foster (p. lv) mentions that the figure for communicants in Lincoln diocese, 242,550, given in the summary and printed by Mr Magee (p. 83), is followed by the word 'quere.' The Lincoln Liber Cleri gives 196,926. Similarly the summary gives 295 recusants; the Liber 222. The numbers of parishes and preachers are also inaccurate. Canon Foster's comment (p. lv) is: " Most of the figures in this summary have been altered, and their appearance does not inspire confidence."

Mr Magee is no more convincing when he bases his argument on printed books. On p. 91 he says: " In Volume VI of the Catholic Record Society there is printed a full list of convictions for recusancy in twenty-two counties, for ten separate years of the reign of Charles II." Mr Magee quotes the figures on p. 96. It is astounding that both he and Mr Joseph S. Hansom, who edited the document (B.M. Add. MS 20739) for the Catholic Record Society, should write as if all these recusants were Catholics; and the more so in that the document itself states in note 3: " It is not certain by this Book, that all the recusants here mentioned are Papists, tis probable many of them are

fanaticks." Any student of Pepys should recognize the word "fanatick" as meaning at that date an uncompromising Puritan of the more extreme type, and the word is found in this sense in the Act Book[1] of the Archdeacon of Bedford, who noted that on April 28, 1669, the churchwardens of Eaton Bray presented "Thomas Hawkins of Dunstable and Mary Harbert Spinster, who under pretence of a marriage after y^e^ phanatique manner live together in fornication."

The number of Bedfordshire recusants (of both sorts) is given in the document (and by Mr Magee, p. 96) as seventy-seven. The document gives seventy-one names, most of which we can find also in the Archdeacon's Act Book, the High Sheriff's Assize documents and in Quaker records; and a careful examination of these identifies at least ten as Quakers, one as an Anabaptist and two as Roman Catholics. Almost certainly sixty-three were Protestant Dissenters, six Roman Catholics, and the other two may have been either, though they were presented in company with Protestant Dissenters and not, in extant records at least, as Papists. Of the ten Quakers, three sign as witnesses or parties to a Quaker wedding[2] at Aspley Guise; two of those and three more subscribed to the buying of Hogstie Meeting House[3] at Aspley Guise; the others, and some of these also, appear in Besse's *Sufferings of the Quakers*, which can be checked with contemporary documents in the British Museum and Friends House.

Stephen Hawthorne of Turvey (one of the seventy-one) was named in the return of 1669[4] as "head or teacher" of the Anabaptist conventicle at Stevington, and in 1672 was licensed as a preacher in his own house at Turvey and also[5] at Stevington.

Both churchwardens and constables were required to present, among various village troubles or delinquencies, unlawful assemblies (*i.e.*, conventicles), absenters from church, and popish recusants. Two only of the seventy-one

[1] Beds. County Record Office, A.B.C. 4, p. 95; printed by the present writer in Vol. XX of the Publications of the Beds. Historical Record Society. [2] Certificate in Beds. County Record Office: D.D.H.W. 1, fo. 87; printed in Vol. XX of Publications of Beds. Hist. Rec. Soc. [3] *Quaker Minute Book*, list supplied by Mr T. A. Spencer, of Aspley Guise. [4] Tenison MS 639/202 at Lambeth Palace, printed in Lyon Turner's *Original Records of Early Nonconformity* and in part in Vol. XX, *op. cit.* [5] P.R.O. MSS printed in Lyon Turner, *op. cit.* Bodleian, Jones MS 22/8929.

were named in extant records as popish recusants. As far as family name, village and social position can be used as evidence, four more of the seventy-one were Catholics; but such evidence and that of the religious census of 1676 would establish all but two of the others as Protestant Dissenters. This census is known as the Compton Return, and a "fair copy" is in the Salt Library at Stafford. Mr Magee, basing his argument mainly on that of Dr Thomas Richards' paper in the Cymmrodorion Society Volume for 1927, claims that the figures are nearly if not entirely valueless (p. 219). So to stigmatize a whole ecclesiastical return, without consideration of its make-up or careful study of the figures for several counties, seems singularly unscholarly. The figures were supplied by the various incumbents to their bishop, and by him returned to the archbishop. A few incumbents may have been incorrect by carelessness; mistakes may have been made in transcription; but to judge the figures on a parish-by-parish examination in Bedfordshire is to find them substantially accurate. They have been compared with returns of 1603, 1669, 1671, 1715, 1717 and 1720, and with the presentments in the Archdeacon's Court and Assizes. Making allowance for the growth of population and for the equation of returns of families and of conformists, the figures approximate, sometimes with surprising exactness. Yet Mr Magee writes on p. 219, "It seems highly probable that only well-known recusants (and very possibly only convicted recusants) were included in the answers to the Bishops' enquiry in 1676. If this view is correct, the enquiry of 1676 is entirely valueless as a guide to the total number of Catholics." This is just "wishful thinking." In Turvey, for example, the Compton Return gives thirty-eight Nonconformists and fourteen Roman Catholics; while the MS list of 1677 (B.M. Add. MS 20739) names eleven convicted recusants, of whom careful inquiry shows four to have been Catholics, six Protestant Dissenters, and the eleventh doubtful but probably Protestant.

In his Appendix VI on this same religious census of 1676, Mr Magee quotes instances of people seeing as many or more Catholics leaving Mass as or than attended the parish church. It was surely true then as it is now that a Catholic chapel served a wider area than most Anglican parishes, and that Catholics came in from the surrounding countryside, as they do still. This was certainly true of

seventeenth and eighteenth century Protestant Nonconformity, whose chapels frequently had their own stables for the horses of those worshippers who rode in from a distance, and of which there is evidence, for example, in the *Narrative of the Persecution of Agnes Beaumont.*

Another printed book used by Mr Magee was Sir George Duckett's *Penal Laws and Test Act*,[1] about whose details Mr Belloc has misled him. King James II was in 1687 seeking suitable candidates for the second Parliament, which he did not call but which he intended should repeal " the Penal Laws and Tests." It is not clear why Mr Magee summarizes King James's questions instead of quoting them verbatim, but the third summary (p. 172), Would he live peaceably with his nonconforming neighbours? does not seem adequate when the question was, " Will you support his Majesties Declaration for Liberty of Conscience, by living friendly with those of all Perswasions, as subjects of y^e^ same Prince, and good Christians ought to do?" Mr Magee quotes Mr Belloc's claim that " as many as one-sixth of the gentlemen who answered the questionnaire were Catholics." Why should Catholics be asked if they would repeal the Penal Laws, especially when, until those laws were repealed, they could not legally become Members of Parliament? Perhaps Mr Belloc was misled by Sir George Duckett. Mr Magee continues (after quoting Mr Belloc's figures for three counties): " In Duckett's book some gentlemen are specifically described as Catholics, while others are marked with a cross. Duckett explains that those so marked were ' chiefly Catholics, on whom the king could rely '." In the manuscript (Bodleian: Rawlinson MSS A. 139) the names are marked in three different ways: one cross, two crosses, and a hand with a pointing finger. Sir George Duckett printed the crosses but omitted the pointing finger without making any substitute for it. Mr Magee has indicated no distinction between the single and the double cross, whereas a study of the answers shows that the single cross meant: " Of no use for the king's purpose "; the pointing finger, " This man would just do "; the double cross, " This is the man for His Majesty's purpose." To claim that they were chiefly Catholics is certainly erroneous. There are Catholics included in some of the lists in the MS

[1] Duckett's book was printed (for subscribers) in 1883, not, as stated on p. 172, 1882.

and in the book, but their names are in answer to a further question put to the lieutenants of the counties: "And lastly as to what Roman Catholicks and Dissenters are fitt to be added to the List of Deputy Lieutenants, or to the Commission of the Peace." Mr Magee noticed among "those marked with a cross" the name of Sir Villiers Charnock and cites him with two others as representatives of families formerly Catholic. He continues (p. 172): "The truth probably is that men such as these were not open recusants or active Catholics, but belonged to the large class of those whose sympathies still lay on the Catholic side." If Mr Magee had looked far enough to find Sir Villiers' reply to the three questions, he might have thought otherwise, for Sir Villiers expressed concurrence with Sir Anthony Chester's view: "he cannot give his consent to take away such Laws as doe support the Church of England and [illegible]," and to the second question, "Will you assist and contribute to the Election of such members [of Parliament] as shall be for taking off the Penal Laws and Tests?" the answer of Sir Anthony and Sir Villiers was: "Being of the same nature [as the first] he cannot consent to it." Were these "chiefly Catholics on whom the king could rely" or men "whose sympathies still lay on the Catholic side"?

If local knowledge of Bedfordshire and its relevant documents has made possible these criticisms, those with local knowledge of other counties would almost certainly call in question some of Mr Magee's figures and statements referring to their counties. It is at least surprising to find on p. 158 Sir Thomas Fairfax of Yorkshire described as a Catholic. There may have been a second Sir Thomas Fairfax, but has anyone ever heard of him or can his identity be established? Much more examination of the evidence is needed. Both churchwardens and petty constables were required to return at least twice a year the names of popish recusants and "absenters" from church to the archdeacon and chief constable respectively. The majority of the returns were probably destroyed, but enough should survive in various places to provide the material for a county-by-county examination of the Compton Return figures. Presentments at Assizes during the Clarendon Code period also need systematic study. Fortunately many County Record Societies exist to publish documents bearing on local history, and in the not too distant future it may be

possible to make a nation-wide survey of these figures. Until that is done the Compton Return does give us the best available figures. For the Province of Canterbury the proportion works out at 1 Nonconformist to 22 Conformists and 1 Roman Catholic to 178 Conformists; or in percentages Nonconformists 4·3 per cent., Roman Catholics 0·5 per cent. Figures for the northern province would undoubtedly increase the Catholic percentage, but there is a large gap between the Compton Return's 0·5 per cent. in 1676 and Mr Magee's estimate of 12·5 per cent. for avowed Catholics in 1688. There would be a spice of ironic humour if, after all, Lord Castlemaine's despised estimate of the Catholics as "not the hundredth part of the nation" proved to be correct.

W. M. Wigfield.

MISCELLANEA

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NOTES

THE ETHICS OF TYRANNICIDE

Dr Hermitage Day concludes that " neither the individual nor the small group can lawfully take life, even the life of a tyrant, without the sanction of the community judicially expressed," from which follows his further conclusion that tyrannicide " is in fact nothing else than murder."

Yet earlier he admits that a dictator " cannot be brought before the ordinary tribunals of justice." It seems, then, that on Dr Day's view a community wishing to rid itself of a tyrant must first take the power out of his hands and then set up a special tribunal to deal with him. Dr Day does not tell us how this could be done, but obviously it could only be by armed rebellion against the dictator and his military forces.

Now in the modern dictator-state this is very nearly impossible, for the military forces have such superiority of armament that no civil rebellion could hope to succeed unless a substantial part of the military forces themselves joined the rebels, which would still mean that, whatever the will of the rest of the community, the military forces would be the arbiters of the community's fate. In any case, however, such a rebellion would lead to widespread loss of life, certainly amongst those directly engaged and probably also amongst non-participants. Thus we are asked to believe that the only ethical way of getting rid of a tyrant is one which would involve the violent deaths of a large number of people, some of them probably completely non-participant. Can the ethical objection to tyrannicide really be strong enough to justify this view ? The principle of the sanctity of human life, upon which presumably the ethical objection to tyrannicide rests, should rule out even more decisively action which would

involve very much greater loss of life, including that of people unwilling to take any side in the conflict.

On the other hand, the continuance of the tyrant in power might well involve appalling loss of life, as well as the destruction of the things which make life worth living. Clearly the principle of the sacredness of human life cannot be invoked to justify the preservation of the life of the tyrant at the cost of the lives of innumerable others.

Dr Day is surely right, however, in insisting that the killing of a tyrant would only be justifiable homicide if it were clearly the expression of the will of the community, but he does not deal with a difficulty met with under all tyrannies—namely, that under the rule of a tyrant the community cannot express its will in a constitutional manner. The common will can only be made known then through public opinion, which is apt to be confused by cross-currents and which, in a dictator-state, can only express itself with extreme caution.

Still, public opinion is so subtly pervasive that even a modern dictator cannot stifle it, and a point may well be reached at which it is unmistakably clear that the will of the community is fundamentally at variance with the will of the dictator. I should say, then, that when the will of the community can only be made known through public opinion, and when in this way the community has clearly shown its desire that the tyrant should be removed, if the killing of the tyrant by an individual is the only alternative to the more widespread and perhaps futile killing involved in armed rebellion, the killer would be the executor of the community's will, and the killing would be justifiable homicide. The killing would be an act of high moral courage for which the killer would deserve, as he would certainly receive, the thanks of the community.

A. E. Morris.

St David's College,
Lampeter.

THE ORGANIC CONCEPTION OF THE CHURCH AND REUNION

(By the Rev. Thomas M. Parker, Theology, May, 1940)

There is a relevant passage in Purcell's *Life of Cardinal Manning*, vol. 2, chap. xxvii, " Hindrances to the Spread of Catholicism," p. 779.

Manning writes: " 1. I have found not only laymen, but priests absolutely ignore the fact that the greater part of the English people are baptized, and therefore are in the supernatural state of grace.

" 2. They take for granted that they have lost their baptismal grace by mortal sin.

"3. And that, therefore, as they have not the sacrament of Penance, they have no means of rising again to the grace of Baptism.

"4. That for this reason their life is without merit.

"5. And their salvation most uncertain.

"I do not believe one of these propositions to be true, and I am convinced that no one ever believes them without being checked in his action, and chilled in his charity towards the non-Catholic people of England."

See also in the same volume pp. 691 and 780.

✠JOHN NASSAU.

LIGHT FROM THE PAST?

EUROPE is in travail—what new birth may be expected? Perhaps the story told by Professor Rostovtzeff in his *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* may give hints of possibilities. That history in broad outline does at times repeat itself needs no arguing. But we must not forget the differences between then and now, the most important of which are perhaps: (*a*) the immense technical and scientific skill of to-day, which, given a settlement of political differences, makes reconstruction after catastrophe possible and even fairly quick; (*b*) the fact that Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean are no longer practically "the world," but are linked intimately with the rest of the planet; (*c*) the discouraging thought that Christianity, which was the seed of new life for the decaying Empire, in the minds of many Europeans to-day has been tried and has failed.

The last century of Republican Rome was marked by cruel exploitation of the conquered lands, which enriched Rome and Italy. The second half of this century was a time of civil wars, the suffering of which fell largely on Italy. As a result she craved for peace at all costs. But it had to be a Roman peace, maintaining the city's ascendancy. There was no opposition from the city-states of the East, which recognized that political liberty had gone for ever and were glad to be left with local self-government. The new order of Augustus was compelled to continue the innovation of the civil wars, when a well paid and disciplined army of professionals for the first time dominated the scene. The supreme ruler was an Imperator, not a Rex.

(Clearly, if modern war lasts long enough, a Europe shattered by disasters will be ready to accept any solution which frees it from the menace of the bombing aeroplane. Without such freedom no one will have the heart to begin rebuilding.)

The commercial activity and brilliant civilization which followed the Augustan peace need no mention. Commerce especially led

to an equalization of Italy and the provinces, for it was free. There were no political boundaries, taxation was not onerous by later standards, and the unit was big enough for large-scale enterprise. (We are reminded of the failure of the recent economic experiment of small national units, each with high protective tariffs.)

When the history of the first century B.C. was repeated in the third century A.D., and fifty years of bitter civil wars devastated the Empire, the conditions of recovery were no longer present. Civilization had declined and economic ruin had set in. The pressure of barbarians on the frontier increased all the time. The brilliant Augustan solution had carried with it the seeds of its own decay. The Empire proved too large for efficient administration. The provinces might have borne the taxes and compulsory labour; but the provisioning and transport of the constantly marching armies broke them.

Rostovtzeff sees in the new régime that succeeded the wars an elemental uprising of the peasants, filled with hate and envy of the privileged class. The army was drawn from them and largely from barbarian stock. Once more the world was glad to accept anything that gave peace. Diocletian and Constantine took over a heritage of hate, envy and chaos, on which they had to build. The new monarchy was modelled on the sacred monarchies of the East, of which the Sassanid Persian dynasty was the living representative. The city-state had gone for ever, and the new simplified régime was based on the country. The economic chaos and the financial exigencies of a great empire made it necessary to base its organization on the requirements of taxation. The peasant became *ascriptus glebæ*, lest he should escape his share of taxation. Other classes hardened into castes, for they too could not be allowed to escape. The Emperors did their best. "They never asked whether it was worth while to save the Roman Empire in order to make it a vast prison for scores of millions of men" (p. 478).

Finally the Empire collapsed in Western Europe. The burdens of life were such that people willingly returned to a simpler economy.

Many explanations are given of the decay of the Empire. They are all, according to our author, different aspects of the fundamental cause, which was a change in mass psychology, as the educated classes were gradually absorbed by the masses, whose outlook became the dominant one for a long period. (That a similar change is taking place in Europe, and that the dictators are the typical men of a new mentality, is generally recognized.)

W. K. L. C.

CORRESPONDENCE

"SIGNPOSTS"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

On page 465 of your June issue your reviewer writes: "I wrestled with Mr Mackinnon's book[1]; went to bed trying to unravel it and then wrestled again. I cannot say that I have yet understood him fully." On page 429 Mr Mackinnon himself writes: "Now I do not profess fully to understand Mr Noel Davey's valuable but exceedingly difficult article on biblical theology in the December issue."

This is in some ways comforting reading. I have sometimes risen from the perusal of a piece of Catholic propaganda feeling like the man who came into a room holding his head and exclaiming, "I have lost my reason! I have read a long poem called Sordello from beginning to end and have not been able to understand two lines of it." I am not, it seems, so singular in my obtuseness as I had feared. Mr Heywood does not understand Mr Mackinnon; Mr Mackinnon does not understand Mr Davey. I am in excellent company.

But why this cult of the abstruse?

In his paper on "Morals and the Modern Novel" your contributor, Mr Norman Nicholson, remarks in an aside concerning an author not, so far as I know, much read in clerical circles, "It was for this novel that he was described by Mr Wyndham Lewis as 'a novelist with a corn-cob.' Mr Faulkner's strength is shown by the fact that he survived that famous 'debunking.'" This kind of thing makes one feel like an intruder who does not know the family jokes. How shall I react? Shall I smile in a reminiscent manner at a witticism of which I have never heard, or chuckle at its exquisite appropriateness? To be honest, I have not the remotest notion of what it means, and I don't mind betting the majority of the readers of THEOLOGY don't know either.

Now I feel convinced that the younger school of English theologians responsible for "Signposts" have something to tell the world. This is my only excuse for writing this ill-natured letter. It is enormously important that they should make themselves heard in these days of crisis, for we desperately need to be brought back to a "renewed concentration on essentials." Mr Mackinnon's book, for instance, is full of pure gold; every priest who wants to be a watchman to his people ought to read it, to assimilate its teaching and to pass it on. But if it is not

[1] *God the Living and the True.* Signposts, No. 2.

impertinent of me to say so, it will not have anything like the sale which it deserves.

The average hardworked parish priest has neither the time nor the ability to spend labour in clarifying obscurities. "Sign-posts" ought to be written by sign-writers, in bold letters that he who runs about his parish may read, not in illegible hand-writing nor in fancy script.

Mr H. G. Wells and Mr Joad take the trouble to write for the million—this more than anything else accounts for their influence. Too many of our brilliant defenders of the faith give the impression that they are writing for an exclusive coterie. They forget that the literary style of Karl Barth is as foreign to the English temperament as the more abstruse American wise-crack is to the English idiom of humour.

M. R. Newbolt.

THE ORDINATION OF WOMEN

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

May I say that, while agreeing on some points with the "member of C.S.M.V." who reviewed Mr Smythe's book on the Ordination of Women in your May number, I and a good many others disagree on other points.

It is true that the proofs are badly corrected, and that the author's statement about Yahweh being the "father of Israel in the same sense as Zeus was the father of gods and men" is quite opposed to *later* Hebrew thought, though many scholars would agree with him that there are traces of this idea underlying the most primitive form of Hebrew religion; but these are minor matters. No one before has taken the trouble to collect the facts about the ministry of women, and it is valuable to have them set out fully. Few people have heard or read what your reviewer truly calls "the at times rather banal discussions of Convocation" on the subject of deaconesses, so that it is a good thing to have them summarized here. No one who has not read them could imagine to what depths a discussion in the Lower House of Convocation could descend. The wide vision and forward outlook of the Archbishop of Canterbury are seen to be in strange contrast with those of "the inferior clergy." A complaint is often made that our Bishops do not lead the Church, but when the Archbishop has the courage to give a lead it is not followed. For one inadequate or paltry reason after another, almost every suggested function of the deaconess was whittled away; and, although the committee (V) of the Lambeth Conference in 1930 declared that the ordination of a deaconess confers on her Holy Orders, this description of her Orders was not allowed to stand in 1939.

However, this is not the main point of the book, which is to examine the case for the ordination of women to the priesthood. And surely here what the author says about vocation deserves more attention than your reviewer gives to it. A woman may feel a strong sense of vocation to the priesthood—we know that many women have felt this call—and yet it is the one vocation which may not be tested; and why? On the ground of sex: "God created man in His own image . . . male and female created He them." Yes, and physiologically male and female they remain; but, as any biologist or psychologist knows, in regard to mental equipment, characteristics, and powers there is no clear-cut line of demarcation; and this is true, also, in regard to spiritual equipment. St Catherine, St Joan, and St Teresa exemplify this, as your reviewer grants; but, as she also allows, there was "a painful struggle before recognition was obtained" in their case.

Mr Smythe asserts that women, no less than men, should have full scope for their religious gifts. That is why some of us plead that this vocation may be tested. As to the "reciprocal character of vocation," how can there be any reciprocity unless, on the Church's side, there is a willingness to allow such testing?

Although Mr Smythe's book has its faults, it is a candid investigation into facts, undertaken by one who approached the subject with a prejudice against the ordination of women, and ended by being convinced that "the Church on the whole would benefit from the full inclusion of women in its ministry." And some of us are deeply grateful to him.

Yours faithfully,

EVELYN W. HIPPISLEY.

June, 1940.

ADOLF SCHLATTER

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

When I was at Tübingen in the winter of 1932, it was my privilege occasionally to attend Professor Schlatter's fortnightly *Tisch-Abend*, and I am therefore the more grateful for Dr Steiner's article on "The Biblical Theology of Adolf Schlatter" in the June number of THEOLOGY. As you have yourself observed, Hoskyns was a devoted admirer of Schlatter, and used often to insist upon the value and importance of his work. But my object in writing is rather to place on record the following anecdote, which I had from my friend Professor Gerhard Kittel, of the Faculty of Evangelical Theology in the University of Tübingen. It relates to the time when, by way of counterblast to the liberal tendencies of Professor Harnack, which were causing considerable apprehension, Schlatter was summoned to a Chair of Theology at Berlin. He had not been there very

long when one morning, as he was coming down the steps of the University, he encountered the very correct and official Prussian *Kulturminister*, who saluted him with these words: "I am delighted, Herr Professor, that you have come to Berlin, in order to represent orthodox theology in our University." Schlatter retorted, with his broad Swiss accent: "Ah bain't coom 'ere to represent anything, Ah'm coom 'ere to work." More than a little taken aback, the *Kulturminister* replied in his most soothing accents, "I meant, Herr Professor, that I am delighted at your coming, because you take your stand upon the Word of God." Schlatter: "Sir, Ah don't stand *upon* the Word of God, Ah stand *under* the Word of God. Good morning!"

Yours very truly,

CHARLES SMYTH.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

ALFRED FAWKES

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

I was greatly interested in Dr Boden-Worsley's sympathetic and understanding appreciation of our mutual friend Alfred Fawkes. May I venture to elucidate a couple of points? Dr Boden-Worsley is right about the attitude of Fawkes to Jowett in his undergraduate days at Balliol. I was told that Fawkes attended Jowett's lectures but instead of taking notes, spent all his time in making sketches, not of Jowett, but of chalices with Hosts peeping out of them.

When Dr Boden-Worsley writes of Alfred Fawkes being threatened with the anti-Modernist oath, I think your readers may derive the impression that the Roman authorities actually confronted Fawkes with the anti-Modernist oath. This was the very thing that they did not do. Fawkes told me that he expected, as a Modernist, to be summoned by the Roman Catholic authorities to take the anti-Modernist oath, but he waited in vain. He noted, however, as the time passed, that the attitude of a number of his Roman Catholic Modernist friends towards him was altering. He wondered why. Then he gathered that the impression was general that he had been confronted by the Roman Catholic authorities with the anti-Modernist oath and had taken it. "This position," said Fawkes, "was intolerable: I resolved at once to sever my connexion with the Roman Church."

I was intrigued by Dr Boden-Worsley's phrase: "a Modernist in the strict sense of the term." I know a good many definitions or descriptions of Modernism, ranging from that to be found in the Encyclical of Pope Pius X—"Modernism is the com-

pendium and poisonous essence of all heresies "—to those of Paul Sabatier, George Tyrrell, Canon Sanday, Percy Gardner, Hubert Handley, Mrs Humphry Ward and a host of others. But I am still in need of that authoritative definition of Modernism which Dr Boden-Worsley seems to possess. Will he reveal " the strict sense of the term "?

H. D. A. Major.

Ripon Hall,
Oxford.

THE GRACE OF BAPTISM

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

We are taught by the Catechism that baptism makes a child " a member of Christ, a child of God, and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven." This is the conferring of grace *ex opere operato*, and let us not be afraid of it. Have we the right to refuse such a gift to a child because its parents are not good church-people? I think not. You say (Theology, July, 1940, p. 4) that " the only children to be baptized should be those born into a household or the household of faith." Is that not practically equivalent to making the regeneration of infants in baptism dependent on the holiness of their parents? We should of course, and I believe we do, make a request for baptism a chance of instructing and exhorting parents: but I cannot see that we have any right ever to refuse to baptize a child because of the parents' lack of Church status. Such action seems to me to savour of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children.

May I make two points? Every parish priest is familiar with the adult who, often apparently without coming under Christian influence, suddenly experiences a conversion. They come to us for guidance and instruction. With such, I have found that it is a tremendous help to them to know that the first step has been taken, and taken by God: they have been baptized. Is it superstitious to believe that here the grace of baptism is at work? Were we to " fence the font," we would make the path of such people more difficult, and I believe we would reduce their numbers.

In Scotland, the practice of infant baptism is by no means general. Generally speaking, only the children of " Church members " are baptized. This means a deepening cleavage between Church and world. It also means that the unbaptized seldom come forward for " Church membership," the Presbyterian equivalent of Confirmation. Those of us who can look back with thanksgiving to many Confirmation candidates drawn from indifferent homes who are now leading active Christian lives, would do anything to prevent a situation arising in England similar to the disastrous one in Scotland. The Church of Scot-

land is making great efforts to make the practice of infant baptism more general!

The grace of baptism, especially of infant baptism, is an "imponderable," but it is real. Dare we, at such a time as this, limit the sphere of God's gracious activity among men?

D. B. MacGregor.

Christ Church Rectory,
Lochgilphead,
Argyll.
July 6, 1940.

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

I feel sure that many parish priests will be grateful to you for your courageous and timely article on "Baptismal Disgrace" in the July number of Theology. To many of us the methods whereby this sacrament is administered seem nothing less than scandalous. Whereas one of the two "Gospel Sacraments" is now habitually attended by much dignity and reverence, the other is often performed in an atmosphere which is charged with hypocrisy and superstition. The difficulty is to induce the clergy themselves to see how utterly unsatisfactory the present system of indiscriminate baptism is. When I pleaded at a recent chapter meeting for a discussion of this urgent problem I was told that they had "done all that." Yes, but done what? The answer was that they had talked about it and yet made no attempt to carry out even the most obvious reforms.

You, sir, have shown clearly what the ideal of baptism is. Yet how often is it carried out? I recently took statistics of the last 150 baptisms held in this church. Of these only two were children of parents who were in any sense worshippers at the church. Three others were children of people who worshipped elsewhere but who, for one reason or another, wished their children to be christened here. The families of fourteen others might be described as loosely connected with the church—*e.g.*, some had older children attending the Sunday School. This left, out of a total of 150 families, 131 (or 87 per cent.) who took no interest whatever in the affairs of the church, and who were presumably therefore indifferent to the spiritual future of their children. A group of clergy to whom I mentioned these figures said that they were sure that things were not so bad in their parishes; but I still believe that, if they would go through their registers and check up on each family, they would receive a nasty shock. Only last Sunday I turned a party away as they had no godfather for the child. They said that they were unable to find anyone to stand, since the menfolk of the family were all either unable or unwilling to come. I offered to try

and find someone of my congregation who would help them out, and invited them to come next Sunday. They departed somewhat disgruntled, only to return some ten minutes later to say that they had found a godfather after all. I believe that they had simply found someone in the street, and perhaps paid him a shilling or two to come. Even when the statutory conditions as to sponsors are fulfilled, who can say that those who stand as godparents are in any way fitted to take the solemn vows which they stumble to pronounce?

Your excellent article gives some indication of reforms which might be carried out. The improvements which I should like to see are these:

First, baptisms should be held once a month or once a quarter (except in urgent cases), and no child should be accepted for baptism until the parents and godparents have been instructed as to what the rite implies.

Secondly, in families where there are any children over the age of five who are receiving no Church instruction, baptism should be refused until those children have become members of the Sunday School. It is ridiculous to baptize infants of parents who are making no effort to keep the promises which have been made over other children.

Thirdly, efforts should be made to see that at least one of the godparents is a practising member of the Church. This could be done by having a rota of people who are willing to stand as sponsors to children whose parents are unable themselves to find any suitable person.

But of course all such improvements are doomed to inevitable disaster unless there is corporate action among the clergy. This is perhaps the most serious aspect of the whole affair. In several districts fervent efforts have been made to reform present conditions, only to be shipwrecked on the rocks of clerical apathy and indifference. It is no good whatever for the Vicar of St Peter's to try to raise the standard if parents can always go round the corner to St Paul's where no questions are asked and no conditions made. This difficulty could be partly overcome if a rule were made, similar to that governing Holy Matrimony, that children must be baptized in their own parish church, and that no priest should be allowed to baptize a child from another parish without express permission of the incumbent.

And there is one final suggestion which I should like to make. Can we really hope to restore dignity and reverence to this sacrament while it continues to be so lightly treated by those who should know better? Priests who make much of the sacramental life will sometimes use, of the sacrament of Baptism, language which they would be horrified to hear applied to the Eucharist. Until we parish priests ourselves take this matter seriously, until we prepare ourselves and our people as carefully as we should for any other sacrament, and until we take more

trouble, in our conversation and in the administration of the rite, to show that we regard it as one of the great meeting-places of God and man, we can have little hope that an uninstructed and largely pagan laity will respond to our efforts towards reform.

Yours faithfully,
JOHN R. H. MOORMAN.

FALLOWFIELD RECTORY,
MANCHESTER.
July 9, 1940.

BUSSELL'S BAMPTON LECTURES

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

I was very glad to read Mr Lisle Marsden's commendation of Dr Bussell's too much neglected Lectures—one of the few volumes of "Bamptons," which are of outstanding and permanent significance.

I would merely wish to add one special point to Mr Marsden's letter. The leitmotiv of the Lectures, to which Dr Bussell constantly swings back from various diverging angles, is the idea of the phrase "for whom Christ died," as constituting the charter of the average man. In this watchword we have at once the very heart of Christian theology and the principal contribution that this has to make to the social thought of our time.

Yours,
N. E. EGERTON SWANN.

ST PAUL'S CHURCH VESTRY,
COVENT GARDEN, W.C. 2.

COMMENT ON LITERARY PERIODICALS

IN the May number of *Horizon*[1] Mr Richards of *The Magnet* wrote a lively reply to George Orwell on penny dreadfuls, which will convince nobody who does not share his violent antagonism to critics and modern art. There was a good poem by Anne Ridler, and Mr Calder-Marshall riled at the preoccupation of Mr Graham Greene with Original Sin in *Brighton Rock* and elsewhere. But on the whole *Horizon* is a disappointment. It can give us no lead except to tell us that we must go on writing and hope that an *East Coker* or two may come off somebody. But to do that you must be Mr Eliot.

Looking back on the last decade from the editorial window

[1] 6, Selwyn House, Lansdowne Terrace, W.C. 1. 1s.

of *Scrutiny*[1] Dr Leavis thinks it was well worth while *not* to be a Marxist in the Marxist era: " There was great need to insist on the element of autonomy and to work for the preservation of the humane tradition—a tradition representing the profit of a continuity of experience through centuries of economic and material change. Further, it was an essential part of our position, as we conceived it, *not* to be as positive as some people —possible sympathizers—would desire: we intended *Scrutiny* to stand for the humane tradition as something to be fostered apart from any particular religious creed; and the fostering of a free play of critical intelligence we thought of as essential to the tradition." (So, in an equally serious sense, do we.) He regrets the failure of *The Criterion* to give them " judicial criticism by more philosophical standards than ours," " for without a serious critical interplay there can hardly be said to be the beginning of a functioning contemporary criticism." But " we shall carry on while we can." Congratulations ! In this number Mr H. B. Parkes continues his study of the American cultural scene. Mr James Smith on *As You Like It* finds the grace of God in Rosalind's conception of mirth. But Mr Olaf Stapledon's " Tradition and Innovation Today " is the wrong kind of article for *Scrutiny*. It covers far too large a ground and is full of ill-supported generalizations about political, scientific, and religious traditions. How, for instance, are we to reject " almost the whole of the Christian metaphysics," and at the same time restore " the Greek value of ' reason ' as opposed to the irrationalism which has found its reduction to absurdity in Nazi culture "? Mr Stapledon wants to get rid of metaphysics altogether for " the scientific study of wholes." " Attempts have already been made in this direction in the Emergence Theory, in Holism, and (in a very different mood) in Dialectical Materialism." How about Nazi biology ? Doubtless metaphysics is often a nuisance to the literary critic, as Dr Leavis finds when he tries to revaluate Coleridge's criticism; but we cannot reconstruct the whole humane tradition without some logical and philosophical discipline.

The Townsman[2] is worried about this. This time it has come out typed upon parchment. Mr Duncan makes complaints about the unknown gentleman who split " reason from conscience, theory from practice, dogma from doing," words from things, " and to his everlasting damnation pitchforked God on the prongs of abstraction, flinging him from the fields of our fathers into the far distant vagueness of a foggy heaven. It was not Dante. Was it the blessed St Thomas ?" He belabours the vicar in his " dressed-up mausoleum," but he lets our friend Jarrett-Kerr go on about *Pigs, Profits and Polytheism*, and Ezra

[1] Deighton Bell and Co., Cambridge. 2s. 6d. [2] West Mill, Morwenstow, Cornwall. 2s.

Pound also on the last topic: "If a race *neglects* to create its own gods, it gets the bump." There is sociology also from Ezra Pound, Lord Lymington, Rev. Henry Swabey (on Spain), and Captain Gerald Brenan (on Portugal). Lord Tavistock tells of his recent adventures. There are more metaphysical contributions from Richard March (on Mediæval and Renaissance thinking), and from K. Noel Weston, reviewing Kuo Chiu Chiu's *Peach Path*. Altogether this is a lively number.

Some editorial comments on the relation of brain to hand in education link up with what Mr Murry has to say on "Imagination and Education" in the April-June *Purpose*,[1] a characteristic defence of the Christian family and of our need to rely on the children of Christian families, which seems to me to be Mr Murry at his very best. Like Mr Duncan he has little use for "the religious education about which bishops write to *The Times*," but he has something very positive to say about education as a whole. The rest of *Purpose* is about the land, the state of the soil, land ownership, the village community (by Mr Desmond Hawkins, who castigates the parish magazine as it now stands). These issues also take up a good deal of room in *The New English Weekly*. We seem to be entering on a period when more and more literary people are interested in theology or agriculture, or both, not only in England but even in the southern states of America. It is Mr E. I. Watkin who warns us in the June *Christendom*,[2] where he and T. S. Eliot and Philip Mairet are writing on the English situation, that if the peasant is pious it is partly because he is stuck in the mud, that the peasant was the last pagan, and the early Christians were mostly urban proletarians anyway. To which the reply may be that what is stuck in the mud is the only thing that will stay put in an invasion.

GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M.

COMMENT ON FRENCH PERIODICALS

Two articles, which appeared in *Études* (December 20, 1939, and March 20, 1940), on the subject "Que vaut la religion du peuple français?" show a profound similarity between the state of religion in that country and the conditions which prevail in our own, once allowance has been made for a different cultus and national character. The first of the articles, which are composed from the observations of priests who were serving in the forces as ordinary soldiers, deals chiefly with what the author describes as "the map of Christian France." In this map almost every class can be paralleled in this country,

[1] C. W. Daniel Co. 40, Great Russell Street, W.C. 1. 1s. [2] Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 2s.

from the old-fashioned provincial Christian, noted for "an almost complete want of indulgence or even of curiosity in regard to what those people do and think who have abandoned the traditions of their forefathers," or the young man of the professional classes, who has an aunt with the Augustinians or the Trinitarians and goes to midday mass (with us he would have an uncle a parson and go to morning prayer), through the great mass of half-Christian people who derive from these sources, to the intellectualist groups of reconverted men—mostly students and the like. It is, to be sure, surprising to find among so logical a people as the French the man who proclaims "*j'ai ma religion à moi*"; though it is a cry that cannot be altogether unfamiliar to any Anglican cleric, one which we should have expected to have found only among peoples of sentimental Teutonic extraction and Protestant traditions. The map of Christian France offers on the whole a picture of lukewarm attachment to Christianity, as a thing to be defended, indeed, but not to be practised. "Very few people imagine that there are any lessons to be drawn from the war. They endure it in order to be able to take up again the lives they lived before, without thinking that the cause of the evil is partly in themselves." The recent calamitous events in France have, for the present anyhow, removed any hope of returning to the old ways and have shown that the corrupt oligarchy of that unhappy land has, in its desire to save as much as possible of its wealth and influence, only reflected a fatal tendency in all classes to maintain the *status quo ante*—a tendency which the present ignominious lot of France seems to some extent to be dispersing in this country.

It is more or less from this point that the second article starts. "The war has not noticeably modified the spiritual condition of our fellow-countrymen. It has been able to improve the real Christians, and I think that in fact those who already prayed, pray more: but the rest are what they used to be." The intimacy in the army between priest and layman, though it certainly rejoiced the hearts of the clergy, and though these last were more than grateful for the removal of a barrier which their cassocks had imposed in civil life, only made more clear and striking what presumably they had always known . . . that Christianity is as remote as any other religion from the vague and somewhat sceptical egoism of the age. The events of recent years had knocked the bottom out of ethical humanitarianism, communism and the other isms, and nothing remained but the desire to preserve as much comfort and freedom as possible for oneself and one's family. It is a curious thing that this sceptical attitude to the world order should have produced little animosity towards Christians. The best description of the position in which the soldier-priests found themselves is that they were not unlike yeast in a lump of dough, but of dough which, though showing the best possible good nature in the world,

positively refused to be leavened. The friendliness of the ordinary soldiers to the Christians, their respect for them, and even the high standard they expect Christians to maintain: none of these things seem to have shown even a semblance of an awakening to the old Faith. War had altered nothing in the affairs of religion, but it left a grave duty to the Christian. For "though the Frenchman be in the ordinary way but slightly religious, one thing horrifies him—the turning of religion to temporal ends . . . and in that scepticism which he so often likes to display in regard to the cause for which he is fighting and dying, there doubtless enters a large element of bluff, the fear of being duped by high-sounding words and big financiers." What he needs to know is that he really is fighting for justice and not for profit in disguise. The writer of the article gives as the only practical answer to this problem (for all Christians know that *what* men need is Christ's Gospel, and the question is, *how* to make them accept it) the duty of Christians to stress the need of absolute justice and complete truth by trying amidst the cares of this world to live the life which alone shows the essential value to men of these great concepts. In fact, neither the problems posed by these articles nor the answer suggested are new: nor does it look as though the answer can ever be completely effective, though it is, and must always remain, practical. Let "the Christian of to-day gradually make familiar to a darkened sight the true face of Christianity. On this head, every French Catholic holds in his hands to-day the religious future of his country." That is a fact which is as true under a German occupation as it was when Frenchmen believed in the Maginot Line.

B. J. Kett.

NADIR

Our world's been poisoned with a recent fare
Polluted by the breath of lunacy;
Else, swept into the suffocacious air
Of what uncharted spaces must it be,
When searches now lone wisdom's telescope
The sunset sky, no rising star to hail,
Upon the waiting negative of hope
To write of failure there its silent tale.

Statecraft, bewildered, owns it, has confessed;
Philosophy rides on unruddered keel,
They were the sages, now in motley dressed;
The Saints with rheumy eyeballs frightened kneel
Before their crumbling shrine and call on Christ,
To keep contrite with Him belated tryst.

John Carroll.

BOOK REVIEWS

NATHANIEL, LORD CREWE, BISHOP OF DURHAM, 1674-1721, AND HIS DIOCESE. By C. E. Whiting. S.P.C.K. 16s.

Students of English church history are familiar with the accusation of political time-serving against the Anglican clergy. One of the salient characteristics of Tudor history is the number of beneficed clergy who remained in their parishes throughout the ecclesiastical changes of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth's settlement. Such a record is not inspiring: for such men are not the stuff of which saints or confessors are made. Similarly those clergymen, typified and immortalized in the person of the vicar of Bray, who withstood the political and religious changes between 1660 and 1714 have received double for their unenviable reputation as political turncoats. The life of Nathaniel Crewe embraced the whole of this later epoch of English history; and, since he was a bishop for fifty years and held the see of Durham for forty-seven, it is natural that his career should have been used as a textbook of political servility. Indeed he came up to Oxford during the Commonwealth, when Anglicanism was suppressed; and his emergence in 1660 as a fervent royalist and episcopalian was the first of the changes which evoked the scornful comment of Oxford contemporaries, Anthony Wood and Hearne, and later of public writers such as Burnet. Their verdicts have survived, even from the pen of so careful a scholar as Mandell Creighton. Dr Whiting has essayed an ambitious venture in offering a juster and impartial survey of Crewe's life.

It is evident that if Crewe's academic success was due to his considerable ability and diligence, his ecclesiastical preferment was due primarily to the favour of Charles II, and particularly to the friendship of James, duke of York. Crewe possessed indeed the inestimable initial boon of noble birth and private wealth. But royal favour singled him out for high office. So far as Charles II was concerned his favour was not so compromising or dangerous, since he subordinated his religious policy to his resolve not to go on his travels again. To be intimate with James II was far more perilous, for James expected of his friends acquiescence in and active support of his religious policy. Such support must have been especially difficult for Anglican bishops, despite their loyalty. Crewe went as far as possible in the direction of compliance. Above all, as Dr Whiting observes, his part in the Ecclesiastical Commission and its several acts cannot be gainsaid. It was the chosen instrument of James for the suppression of the Church of England; and Crewe was no merely passive member. Whether or not he saw

the ultimate end and danger of James's policy cannot affect this point.

Yet when the Revolution of 1688 came to pass, Crewe accepted it. Many of his brethren indeed stopped short of Non-juring, and accepted the new order with a wry face. The general interpretation of Crewe's conduct was that he was resolved to remain Bishop of Durham; and a convenient absence from England for a period (though not to take counsel at St Germains) followed by a quiet taking of the oaths, seemed corroborative evidence. Crewe defended himself in the House of Lords by a speech of recantation of former mistakes. Most people read it as a clear case of *post hoc propter hoc*. But Crewe remained in the Bishopric, not only to return to royal favour under Anne, but to proclaim George of Hanover as her successor. Dr Whiting's judgment on the political aspects of Crewe's career is convincing.

But Crewe as Bishop of Durham was a great prelate. As a bishop he exceeded the *annos Petri*, and most of the episcopates of Anglican history. His private fortune and his temporal status combined to make his tenure of Durham memorable for princely hospitality. In episcopal administration he was typical of the standards of his age—that is, he lived the greater part of the year in London, visited his diocese annually for confirmations, and held a triennial visitation. Perhaps the most disappointing feature of Dr Whiting's researches is the failure to discover details of Crewe's confirmations and ordinations. Such evidence is generally hard to discover; but where it has survived is illuminating and valuable. The scramble for wealthy prebends of Durham seems to have been the same in the Caroline age as in the Hanoverian; and the standard of churchmanship in the parishes varies little from type.

Dr Whiting has brought to his volume an abundance of erudition, pressed down and running over. His long residence in Durham has contributed a mine of detailed local information. At times this detail is rather overwhelming, and the reader is carried along curious bypaths according to the author's minute knowledge. But the main outlines of the career of the statesman-prelate are clear. Dr Whiting protests against acceptance of the censures of Wood, Hearne, and Burnet, and rightly corrects their bias. His own interpretation is sometimes affected by prejudices against typical seventeenth-century traditions. Nathaniel Crewe must be judged by the standards of his day. Not the least of his virtues was his munificence to Oxford, of which many memorials remain to this day. Nor will Dr Whiting's memorial of his life and times be accounted unworthy of its subject.

N. Sykes.

AN ESSAY ON METAPHYSICS. By R. G. Collingwood. Oxford University Press. 18s.

Has Kant's awkward question ever been satisfactorily answered: How can metaphysics establish itself on the sure path of a science (meaning " science " not in the narrow sense of " natural science," but in the sense of a systematic inquiry into some determinate subject-matter)? Professor Collingwood thinks that the trouble is that people have tried to represent metaphysics as a science of " Pure Being." But Pure Being cannot be a proper subject-matter of scientific thought, since by definition it is not a determinate subject-matter differentiated from others. Metaphysics can become a science—*i.e.*, know what it is supposed to be doing and the proper method of getting on with doing it —if it is clearly recognized to be a form of *historical* thinking. Its subject-matter will then be the discovery of the absolute presuppositions on which scientific thinking (always in its wide and proper sense) rests in any period. Professor Collingwood turns the flank of the logical positivists' contention that, since metaphysical propositions are not analytic or verifiable, they are non-sensical by maintaining that the question whether they are verifiable or true or false does not arise, because they are not propositions at all but *presuppositions*. The proper question is therefore one of fact—do people presuppose or have they presupposed them ?—and this must be answered by the methods of historical inquiry. Hence any metaphysical statement should be prefixed by the rubric: " It is, or was, absolutely presupposed that . . ." The Christian creeds, by presenting, not propositions, but an explication of presuppositions prefixed by " I " or " We believe . . ." have thus realized the proper form of metaphysical statements.

On a cursory view this would suggest a thoroughgoing historical relativism, if the only question which can properly be asked about a metaphysical statement is, not whether it is " objectively true," but whether in fact people do or have presupposed it. But Professor Collingwood is not so simple as that. It is no accident that the book contains a forcible polemic in the name of truth and reason against fashionable and insidious cults of irrationalism. For " truth " and " reason " become more than merely honorific titles when we understand them explicitly in the sense in which they are understood in historical inquiry. " The truth " in history means the way the evidence at our disposal obliges us to answer a question which we put to our sources. But to get going we must be able to see and formulate the question, and in asking questions we always make certain assumptions. Some of the assumptions we make are " relative " presuppositions—*i.e.*, they can be questioned and reinstated (or not) as answers to other questions. But of an absolute pre-

supposition we might say, " Others abide our question, thou art free"; because if we did not presuppose it we should not be able to ask questions at all, in the way in which in the context of contemporary thought they can be significantly asked. Thus the notion of Cause was an absolute presupposition of physics in Kant's time, but it was not a universal *a priori* category—the best work in contemporary physics no longer depends upon that presupposition. One is tempted here to ask why the metaphysician should not be an *enfant terrible* and ask a radical question about an absolute presupposition of a period, and so turn it into a relative presupposition, and that perhaps Hume was doing this about the notion of Cause. Professor Collingwood might reply to this that most of Kant's First Critique was written to show Hume that he couldn't. In effect Professor Collingwood seems to allow the metaphysician only to be an *enfant terrible* in the sense of the child in the story of the Emperor's New Clothes—he may call attention to the fact that people are no longer seriously presupposing something, though they haven't owned up to it. I should feel happier about this limitation if I could feel sure of where Professor Collingwood would draw the line between an absolute presupposition and a " dogma " in T. E. Hulme's sense—*i.e.*, something which is not a theory or doctrine consciously formulated, and objectively " entertained," but which is so taken for granted that it forms as it were the spectacles through which we see our theories. Part of the job of philosophy may be to draw these dogmas into explicit consciousness and see what they look like; and when we do so, we may decide that they don't look up to much. For instance, we may find they are largely " ideological " (to use the jargon)—*i.e.*, perspectives distorted by our economic and social position. I take it that an absolute presupposition will stand being looked at like this—which doesn't mean that it can be treated as a proposition, and " verified." Professor Whitehead (whose *obiter dicta*, if not his systematic theories about philosophy, often give independent support to Professor Collingwood) says that no metaphysical statement can be proved—all you can say is that it commends itself as self-evident to civilized minds. I believe this is right; and also that there is an imperceptible process of shift in what commends itself to civilized minds at different periods—meaning here by " civilized minds " those who are getting on with their thinking by enabling relevant questions to be asked and answered in science, history, law, religion, politics, and so on. Philosophy is a secondary activity, trying to make explicit the generalities implied in these primary activities of the mind, so that the shift depends on what the state of thought in these in fact presupposes. So, as Professor Whitehead has said elsewhere, a philosophical position is never disproved: it is merely abandoned when it ceases to be relevant.

The chapter in which Professor Collingwood argues that the doctrine of the Trinity, as formulated by patristic writers, contains the absolute presuppositions of natural science, as calculated to make positivists howl with rage, is masterly. As a piece of historical theology, I am not so sure. I can only query anything which Professor Collingwood says on a point of history with diffidence and under correction. But were the fourth-century Fathers seriously preoccupied with the presuppositions of natural science, or were they primarily concerned with defining what they held to be the content of Christian revelation in relation and sometimes in opposition to Greek philosophy? Whether they would have recognized their doctrines in Professor Collingwood's paraphrase I leave historical theologians to judge. I can only register a certain uneasiness. But that belief in God is in the end an absolute presupposition of rational inquiry can, I believe, be shown to be the real point of the so-called "Ontological Argument." Could it then be said that metaphysics is concerned with an absolute ground which, as the ground of *all* thought, is not purely historical in the sense in which the presuppositions people make in different periods are purely historical facts? Yet that nevertheless this absolute ground is to be approached, not through a study of Pure Being (whatever that might mean), but through appreciating relevant questions which can only be asked from the context of historical situations?

DOROTHY M. EMMET.

EDUCATION AND THE BIRTH-RATE: A SOCIAL DILEMMA. By Grace G. Leybourne and Kenneth White. Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.

Oddly enough, the fact that this elaborate study fails to establish its central thesis, which is, quite simply, that costs of education in England exercise an adverse influence upon fertility, detracts little from the high value of the book. In a land where the impulse to social climbing is probably stronger than anywhere else in the whole world, and where the criteria by which particular forms of education are assessed are much more concerned with the "climbing" values of a school label than with the genuine educational values of particular kinds of regimen, it would be surprising if parental ambition, acting along with the high expensiveness of the socially valued labels, did not contribute materially to the tendency to limit families.

But, while we are probably justified in accepting this as a fact, we must nevertheless submit that this book, with all the statistical skill it displays, and all the elaborate analysis of conditioning factors that it offers so competently, does not succeed

in formulating a convincing proof. Indeed it is doubtful whether in such a medium convincing proof, such as would satisfy scientific postulates, can be attained.

Confident and repeated assertions of strong probabilities, we must contend, do not amount to proof. Here is a typical passage (pp. 323-324):

> " Conclusive or exhaustive proof of this contention (*i.e.*, the main thesis of the book) has been lacking, for it could only have been obtained from the mouths of the innumerable parents concerned. Scattered, but direct evidence, however, is plentiful. In addition, coinciding with this developing desire for higher education, birth-rate figures have reflected a steady decline in the size of families. It can be taken, therefore, as beyond all possibility of reasonable doubt, that the cost of paying for the new education must be assigned a significant share of responsibility for our contracting family circles."

(That the confidence expressed in such passages is not always genuinely felt is shown in an uneasy footnote tucked away at the bottom of p. 40.)

The most fruitful way in which to read a most valuable and timely book is, undoubtedly, to accept at once the main contention of the authors, quite independently of their attempts to establish it scientifically. For if educational costs are exerting a restraining influence upon fertility to a dangerous extent, as seems to be the case, then the reason is to be found not in any peculiarities of education as such, but in the peculiarities of English social structure and of the social motivations that play (or prey?) upon family life in England. As the authors themselves say (p. 364):

> " For many members of our community the end of education has largely ceased to be autonomously cultural, and has become firmly established as socio-economic."

The book demonstrates abundantly that the infection—for such it is—while strongest and most harmful in certain strata of our stratified society, now pervades the whole. It is hardly within their scope to display the full costs in surrendered snobberies and in drastically revised notions of " standard of life " that we shall have to incur in ridding ourselves of it. But not the least of the values of the book is that it will stimulate many a thoughtful reader to estimate these costs (the moral costs of regeneration) and to ask himself how far he, for his part, is willing to pay.

In any case is it conceivable that this order of things can survive the war, a pseudo-educational order one of the main features of which is that a small minority, coming up through a privileged and mainly private system of schools, governs the great majority coming up through a publicly provided system? Schools, *as schools*, ought never to be put to such uses, and it

would seem as though England is the last country to continue the practice. Where else is a man judged and socially " placed," not by what he is or by what his education has made him, but by the school label he carries ?

The section in which the authors discuss the " independent " schools (including the public schools) is, accordingly, of particular interest. They are well aware that any handling of what is known as the " public school problem " which will satisfy an awakening social conscience will involve much more than the handing out of a few State subsidies on terms which will involve a minimum of disturbance whether to the schools themselves or to the traditional order of which they have been a pillar.

Ignorance of the forces that determine the working of our educational system (or systems), and of the effects of such working, is still so widespread that we hope this book, heavy going as some of it is, will be widely read and thoughtfully pondered; especially by those who are deeply and penitently concerned with the *moral* causes of our present sufferings.

The authors are abundantly right when they argue that a drastic revision of the customary standards by which we have allowed ourselves to live is essential to any effective reform. They indeed are concerned with those who ought to be born in the natural sense. How much more true for that re-birth in the spiritual sense which, as the ultimate purpose of education, seems nowadays to be so much better understood by others than by those whose whole concern with education it should be.

F. Clarke.

SHORTER NOTICES

Selections from St John Chrysostom. By J. F. D'Alton. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 8s. 6d.

Two of Chrysostom's works, *De Sacerdotio* and *On the Statues*, are not infrequently studied. Otherwise, it is difficult to know, without guidance, where best to read among the hundreds of homilies which fill eighteen volumes of Migne. Monsignor D'Alton's selections are therefore most welcome. Whoever works through this book will gain an excellent idea of the life, thought and eloquence of one of the noblest leaders of the early church.

The extracts are printed (and how pleasantly !) in Greek, without translation but with good notes. They are grouped in twelve chapters, each with its introduction and bibliography. Here are passages on the priesthood, on education, on St Paul,

on theatre, circus and hippodrome, on monastic life and grace after meat, beside letters to Pope Innocent and glimpses of Julian the Apostate, Eutropius and Eudoxia, and the tragic story of Chrysostom's exile.

A word of criticism may be useful if a second edition is required. In so scholarly a book, the bibliographies might be more precise. No dates are given, and some articles (Nairn, Baynes) lack the periodical reference. Gibbon is once quoted by the page without mention of the edition used. A note on the sources of Chrysostom's life, especially Palladius, would be useful.

S. L. Greenslade.

A Prophet of the Soul: Fyodor Dostoievsky. By Zenta Maurina. Translated by C. P. Finlayson. James Clarke and Co. 6s.

The literature of the smaller Balkan countries is so little known in England that a study of a Russian novelist by a Latvian author should be particularly welcome. Miss Maurina obviously has a thorough knowledge of her subject, and she is, because of the geographical situation of her country, able to understand the social and national conditions described in Dostoievsky's novels better than a westerner, and yet to avoid the curious judgment passed on them by modern Russian Marxist critics. The reader is inclined to feel, however, that Miss Maurina could have made better use of her advantages if she had written the book in the form of a critical biography. Instead, it is rather a group of separate studies, of which one is a summary of the various critical opinions held about Dostoievsky, two are biographical, and the rest critical.

Miss Maurina's chief aim is to discover a connected philosophical point of view behind the novels. This is a difficult, and not altogether valuable, work, for the novels are largely a series of separate clairvoyant scenes, and it is Dostoievsky's art rather than his philosophy which binds them into a coherent whole. There are times when the plot of even so late a novel as *A Raw Youth* seems like the opening and shutting of a lot of drawers one after the other. The actions, too, of some of his people might appear to be a concatenation of inconsistencies (the following of which is not made easier for some English readers by the multiplication of Russian names), were it not for some strange core of character which holds them together.

Nevertheless, Miss Maurina's account of Dostoievsky's life is interesting, especially when she links it with incidents in the novels.

Norman Nicholson

CRITICAL REALISM. By G. Dawes Hicks. Macmillan. 15s.

It is perhaps beginning to be appreciated how much the Hegelian habit of thought, being as it is the more or less conscious revolt from the Aristotelian philosophy as it has come to us through St Thomas, is alien to the principles of Christian theology. It is therefore welcome to find in this book of Professor Dawes Hicks that type of philosophical method which Kant fathered and named "critical" being used to attack idealism in many of its manifestations, and to restate a realist metaphysic.

Professor Dawes Hicks deals faithfully *seriatim* with the arguments which have been built on the word "*sensum*" and the word "image"; with the philosophy of F. H. Bradley; with the more metaphysical excursions of the professors of relativity; with Professor Broad's doctrine of the mind; and with subjectivism and solipsism, using here Dr W. T. Stace of Princeton as the object of his attack.

Not unexpectedly, Dr Dawes Hicks finds the demolition of idealism easier than the statement of realism, and in face of the old crux of the reality of the universal, he is driven to adopt Meinong's distinction of existence from subsistence (p. 138), a way of escape which can rapidly become embarrassing.

In one place (p. 144) the existence of God is used by Professor Dawes Hicks as the basis of his argument, though he speaks of Him only as the *élan de vie*. But as more or less the whole of his logic is directed against methods of thought which, whether avowedly or not, are in fact contrary to Christian theology, the work is one which the Catholic philosopher can approve and may well find useful.

R. C. RATCLIFF.

ANNOUNCING THE PSALMS AND LESSONS. By Oscar Hardman. S.P.C.K. 6s.

This is a sensible and useful aid to Public Worship. Given the unsatisfactory Lectionary of 1922, the use of this book will help to make a congregation listen to the readings more attentively and intelligently. A brief preface advocates a double announcement—the second one in the form, "The Book of Job, chapter one, verse one." Then follow succinct introductions to the appointed psalms and to the Lessons in order—giving the main point or character of each. When a Lesson is purely narrative and easy to follow, the introduction is not necessary, and the practice, if slavishly followed, might be wearisome; but in other cases it is a commendable expedient, especially if clergy will also study the Lesson before reading it in public. Dr Hardman has done his work carefully and the book, one hopes, will be found on many lecterns and prayer-desks.

L. S.

WHAT A LAYMAN SHOULD BELIEVE. By A. F. Winnington-Ingram. Longmans. 3s. 6d.

This little book, which is typical of its author, arose out of the much misunderstood Report on Doctrine. It is not addressed to those whose difficulties are very serious, but rather to the perplexed, and to the many who have become careless. Brief chapters treat of such subjects as Providence, the purpose of life, the inspiration of the Bible, the Person of Christ, why He was crucified, the Empty Tomb. The many anecdotes, drawn from the Bishop's own wide experience, may well help the reader clear his mind and, what is more, face life and the Cross.

F. E. BARKER.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: C. E. Hudson, *The Church and the World*, Vol. II (7s. 6d.).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: F. P. Keyes, *Along a Little Way* (1s. 6d.).

CAPE: N. Dearmer, *The Life of Percy Dearmer* (10s. 6d.).

CHALLENGE LTD: *Baptism: a Message to Parents* (1d. or 7s. 6d. per 100).

C.L.A.: G. Sampson, *Catholic Teaching on the Blessed Sacrament* (1s. 6d.).

JAMES CLARKE: D. R. Davies, *The Two Humanities* (7s. 6d.).

DACRE PRESS: T. M. Parker, *The Re-creation of Man*, Signposts No. 6 (1s.).

ANDREW DAKERS: R. Merton, *Sons of the King* (6s.).

LONGMANS: A. F. Winnington-Ingram, *Fifty Years in London* (10s. 6d.).

MOREHOUSE-GORHAM: F. E. Wilson, *An Outline of the English Reformation* (30 c.).

S.C.M. PRESS: A. J. Toynbee, *Christianity and Civilization* (1s.); T. E. Jessop, *Law and Love* (6s.).

S.P.C.K.: *The Church in Country Parishes* (2s.); *Kindred and Affinity as Impediments to Marriage* (2s. 6d.); J. H. B. Masterman, *Sunday Teaching* (6s.); W. Kendrick, *The New Testament for the Children*, III (2s.); S. Owsley, *Paul: the Herald of God* (2s. 6d.).

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